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While not attracting the attention of many scholars, the antipyramiding
provision (the "provision") of the Investment Company Act (the "Act") has had
a profound role in the development of the mutual fund industry. The provision
limits one mutual fund's ability to invest in another such find. Following a
discussion of the provision's restrictions on such investments, the author
explores the historical and practical justifications underlying the Act and its
amendments. The author examines the nexus between the rationale for enacting
the provision and the effect of the statutory language. The provision is
evaluated in terms of its efficacy in addressing the policy arguments put forth by
the drafters: redemption pressure on portfolio funds, excessive concentration of
financial power, layering of fees, and undue organizational complexities. An
examination of the management sphere pinpoints how the provision may
exacerbate mutual fund industry problems arising from separation of ownership
and management. The author concludes that the provision's attempt to restrict
the power of fund managers has not succeeded. The provision's ultimate effect
has been a weakening of the fund governance process and the market for
control of funds-important shareholder checks on fund managers' behavior.
The Investment Company Act's "antipyramiding" provision-which
prevents mutual funds from owning more than three percent of the shares of
any other fund-has received little scholarly attention. Yet it appears the
provision has affected the structure of the fund industry and the nature of
mutual funds' governance process. Specifically, the provision may have led to
the fragmentation of ownership of fund shares and the proliferation of mutual
funds. This fragmentation, in turn, may be partially responsible for the high
fees paid by fund investors and the exceptional profits enjoyed by fund
managers.
This Article examines the goals and effects of the antipyramiding provision.
Part I summarizes the legal structure of a mutual fund and the current state of
the fund industry. In Part II, this Article analyzes the text of the antipyramiding
provision in depth. Part It examines the history of the antipyramiding
provision, from its adoption as part of the Investment Company Act of 1940 to
its amendment in 1996. In Part IV, the stated goals of the provision are
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examined. This Article shows that because the provision is not well drafted to
accomplish these goals, questions arise about the provision's true purposes. Part
V fits the antipyramiding provision within the body of legal scholarship
addressing the problems arising from separation of ownership and management
of corporations. The conclusion is that the antipyramiding provision has
weakened two methods by which shareholders might control the behavior of
their fund's manager: the fund governance process and the market for control
of funds. The Article finishes by hypothesizing that, because of this weakening
of monitoring mechanisms, the antipyramiding provision may partially explain
certain conditions in the fund industry.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Definition of Mutual Fund
Defined simply, a mutual fund is an entity that raises money from investors
and invests the proceeds in securities.' The securities are owned by a separate
legal entity that sells shares to investors. The shares entitle their owners to a pro
rata interest in the pooled assets. The fund is managed by a board of directors
elected by the fund's shareholders. The fund enters into a contract with an
entity that manages the fund's investments for a fee, which is generally a
percentage of assets under management. The manager is generally an affiliate
of the entity that organized the fund and promoted its sale to investors.
Mutual funds are divided into two types. "Open-end" funds offer shares
continuously and grant investors a right to redeem their shares on demand at
their current value.2 Open-end fund shares are not transferable. "Closed-end"
funds, by contrast, do not offer a redemption right to investors, who may exit
the fund only by selling shares on an exchange, as they would corporate stock.3
Closed-end funds do not offer shares for sale continuously as open-end funds
do.
'For a detailed description of the structure of a mutual fund, see Wallace Wen Yeu
Wang, Corporate Versus Contractual Mutual Funds: An Evaluation of Structure and
Governance, 69 WAsH. L. REv. 927 (1994).
2 See Invesment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(1) (1994) (stating that an
open-end company is "a management company which is offering for sale or has outstanding
any redeemable security of which it is the issuer"). The redemption right may be subject to
limitations.
3 See id. § 80a-5(a)(2) (stating that a closed-end fund is "any management company
other than an open-end company").
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B. The Fund Industry
The role of mutual funds in the U.S. financial sector has grown
dramatically in recent decades. The total assets held by mutual funds rose from
$448 million in 19404 to about $3.73 trillion in April 1997. 5 Assets held by
mutual funds have grown faster than those of any other financial intermediary. 6
Although this growth has been widely discussed, two developments in the fund
industry have not been explained: the significant increase in the number of
mutual funds, and the increase in fund expense ratios.
In 1940, the year the Investment Company Act (the "Act") became law,
there were sixty-eight mutual funds of all types operating.7 By April 1997, this
number had grown to 6472. 8 The number of funds thus grew at an average
annual rate of approximately seventy-seven percent-more than twice the
growth rate of fund assets. 9 Although the average equity mutual fund grew over
the 1970-1995 period, it did so less rapidly than did the value of the stock
market.10 As the number of funds has increased, the fraction of total industry
assets held by the average fund has significantly decreased.11
This large increase in the number of funds and the relatively small increase
in the size of the average fund are difficult to explain for several reasons. First,
the significant economies of scale inherent in fund management12 should create
4 See bNESMENT Co. INST., MuTuAL FuND FACT BOOK 27 (36th ed. 1996).
5 See Trends in Mutual Fund Investing April 1997 (visited Aug. 1997)
<http://www.ici.org/facts figures/trends_0497.htmnl>; see also The Seismic Shift in
American Finance, ECoNOMisT, Oct. 21, 1995, at 75.
6 See INVESTMENT Co. INsT., supra note 4, at 11.
7 See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF MUTUAL FUND MARKeTS:
COMPEITION VERSUS REGuLATION 8 (1990).
8 See Trends in Mutual Fund Investing April 1997, supra note 5.
9 See simENr Co. INsT., supra note 4, at 120; see also Diana B. Henriques,
Seeking Data on Funds, Investors and Regulators Find Frustration, N.Y. TIbMS, Aug. 9,
1994, at Al, D2.
10 'Me average equity fund had approximately $111 million in assets in 1978 and $573
million in 1995, an increase by a factor of 5.2. See INVEMEN Co. INST., supra note 4, at
119-20. During this time, the Standard and Poor's 500 Stock Price Index rose by a factor of
9. See id. at 101.
11 The average fund in 1970 held about 0.3% of the $47.6 billion invested in all stock
and bond funds. In 1995, the average fund held only 0.02% of the $2,067 billion invested in
all such funds. See INvEsrmENT Co. INsT., supra note 4, at 34, 119.
12 See WHARTON SCH. OF FIN. & COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MUTuAL FuNDS, H.R.
REP. No. 87-2274, pt. 1, at 29 (1962) [hereinafter "WHARTON STUDY"]; Robert W. McLeod
& D.K. Malhotra, A Re-Examination of the Effect of 12-B-1 Plans on Mutual Fund Expense
Ratios, 17 J. FIN. RFs. 231 (1994); Michael L. Sapir & James A. Bemstein, Reorganizations
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a strong incentive for growth in fund size. Such economies of scale result from
the fact that the expenses associated with fund management increase more
slowly than does the size of assets under management. Sources of economies of
scale include savings resulting from larger securities trades and from more
efficient utilization of investment analysis; computers; shareholder servicing,
accounting, record-keeping and reporting systems; and legal services. 13 While
empirical study would be needed to assess whether the rate of growth is
consistent with the economies of scale funds experience, the slow rate of
growth of the average fund and the proliferation of funds in the face of
economies of scale suggest that other external factors are shaping the structure
of the fund industry.
Second, the increase in the number of funds occurred during a time of
consolidation among banks and other financial intermediaries. 14 Consolidation
among banks is believed to have resulted at least in part from the presence of
scale economies similar to those that apply to mutual funds. 15
Third, it may be argued that the number of funds is excessive relative to the
needs of fund investors. Focusing for the moment on stock funds alone, the
system used by the Investment Company Institute (ICI), the fund industry's
trade association, 16 to classify funds based on investment objective divides such
funds into twenty-one categories. 17 A major financial magazine classifies stock
of Investment Companies, 50 Bus. LAw. 817 (1995) (listing funds' SEC filings that cite
economies of scale as a benefit of consolidation of funds within a fund family); Carole Gould,
Fees-Front, Back and Sideways, N.Y. TRMES, Mar. 15, 1992, § 3, at F14; Jeffrey M.
Laderman, Are Fund Managers Carving Themselves Too Fat a Slice?, Bus. WK., Mar. 23,
1992, at 78.
13 See Martin J. Gruber, Another Puzzle: The Growth in Actively Managed Mutual
Funds, 51 J. FIN. 783 (1996); Vineeta Anand, Roberts Urges Review of Mutual Fund Fees,
PENSIONS & INvEsrMENRs, Feb. 21, 1994, at 19. These economies of scale are part of the
reason investors decide to invest through mutual funds (rather than holding individual stocks)
in the first place.
14 See Valuation of the Banking Industry, CoRp. GROWTH REP. (WKLY.), Apr. 22,
1996, at 8046, available in LEXIS, BusFin Library, API File ("The number of commercial
banks has decreased from 14,400 in 1985 to 10,450 in 1995.").
15 See Ronald G. Burke, The New Architecture of Financial Intermediation, BANIKNG
STRATEGiES, Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 4; Marilyn R. Seyman & Steven P. Williams, Comment:
To Stay Independent, Check Cost Structures, AM. BANKER,, Jan. 6, 1995, at 9.
16 The Investment Company Institute (ICI) members' assets account for approximately
90% of total industry assets. See letter from Investment Company Institute to Thomas S.
Harman, Chief Counsel, Div. Inv. Management, SEC (Feb. 7, 1989).
17 See SrIMNT Co. INST., supra note 4, at 19-21. The ICI identifies three
categories of funds that invest in both stocks and bonds and eight categories of bond funds.
See id.
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funds into a total of sixty-three possible categories. These categorization
systems suggest that the 2763 stock funds extant in April 1997 far exceed the
degree of variety in investment options that investors need or even can
comprehend18
Another paradox of the fund industry has been fees. The average expense
ratio 19 of U.S. equity funds (calculated as a percentage of managed assets)
approximately doubled during the past four decades, increasing substantially
since the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) first identified excessive
fees as a fund industry problem.20 Evidence exists that the fees advisers charge
mutual funds exceed investment management fees charged to other institutions,
like pension funds, for comparable services.21
18 See Mark Bautz, Investors Shout Bravo!, MONEY, Feb. 1997, at 76 (dividing stock
funds into "Aggressive Growth," "Growth and Income," "Capital Growth," "International,"
"Foreign Regional," and "Specialty and Total Return," and classifying each type by whether
the companies in which the fund invests are small, medium, or large and whether the fund's
investment "style" is "growth," "value," or a blend).
19 The expense ratio is the ratio of the sum of all costs of ownership of a fund to the
fund's assets. See Wang, supra note 1, at 989. It includes the fee paid to the fund's adviser for
management of the fund and its portfolio; administration costs, such as "record-keeping and
transaction services" (which may or may not be included in the investment advisory contract);
and "other operating expenses, such as custodial fees, taxes, legal and auditing
expenses .... directors' fees," and marketing and distribution costs. Id. at 989-90. It can be
difficult to properly allocate certain costs (such as marketing, distribution, legal, accounting,
and research and analysis) incurred by a fund "family"-a group of funds managed by a
single adviser-to a particular fund.
20 See Riva Atlas, Watch Those Costs, FORBES, Aug. 30, 1993, at 112 (expense ratio
rose from 0.79% in 1956 to 1.45% in 1993); see also Gould, supra note 12, at F14;
Laderman, supra note 12, at 78; Ken Sheets, How Fund Expenses Nick Your Profits,
KipuNGER's PERS. FRN. MAG., Apr. 1996, at 34 (average expense ratio rose from 1.17% of
assets in 1985 to 1.45% in 1995); Ruth Simon, Avoid Stock and Bond Funds with High
Expenses, BUFFALO NEws, Mar. 6, 1995, at D10 [hereinafter Simon, Avoid Stock and Bond
Funds] (diversified stock funds with average or below-average expense ratios outperformed
those with above-average expenses by a margin larger than the expense differential); Walter
L. Updegrave, Why Funds Don't Do Better, MONEY, Aug. 1995, at 58, 63 (from 1979 to
1995, expense ratios for diversified stock funds rose about 35% and those of taxable bond
funds have increased 14%, while municipal bond fund expenses dropped 12%); Jason Zweig,
Your Funds May Be Making You Rich... But You're Also Getting Robbed, MONEY, Jan.
1997, at 62, 64 (from 1986 to 1995, management fees as a percentage of assets under
management increased 11.8% and overall expenses increased 22%); Erik R. Sirmi & Peter
Tufano, Buying and Selling Mutual Funds: The Impact of Costly Search 29 (table I) (Apr.
1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (annual expense ratios (excluding loads)
of 690 funds with investment objective of aggressive growth, growth and income, or long-
term growth was 0.96% in 1971 and 1.44% in 1990).
21 See REPORT OF THE SEC ON THE PUBuC POCY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT
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This increase in fees is also difficult to explain.22 Because of the scale
economies discussed above, expenses (as a fraction of assets managed) should
decline as assets grow. Because fees are customarily defined as a percentage of
assets, if the size of a fund increased and the fee rate remained the same,
managers would reap a windfall as their fees increased more than their
expenses did. In fact, managers have on average increased their fees as a
percentage of assets so that this windfall has been even greater. Finally, the
increase in fund charges has occurred despite the appearance of technological
improvements that appear to have reduced funds' operating costs.23 All of these
facts are consistent with the very high, and increasing, profits that fund
managers earn.24
A related paradox is fund investors' apparent lack of concern with fund
expenses. Although investors tend to buy more of funds that reduce their fees,
fee increases appear not to cause investors to sell their shares. 25 Indeed, some
studies have found a positive correlation between expense ratios and fund
inflows (i.e., the higher a fund's expenses, the more new investment it
receives).26 In addition, although investors are to some extent attracted by good
CoMPANY GROWTH, H.R. RE'. No. 89-2337, at 311-24 (1966) [hereinafter "PPI REPORT"]
(average advisory fee for mutual funds with assets of $100 million or more is 0.45%, 7.5
times greater than the typical bank fee charged for managing pension funds and profit-sharing
plans, which is 0.06%); WHARToN STUDY, H.R. REP. No. 87-2274, pt. 1, at 29, 504 (1962);
Saul Hansell, J.P. Morgan Shifts Strategies to Buy a Stake in Fund Concern, N.Y. Tms,
July 31, 1997, at Cl, C8 (stating that fees paid and profits earned in investment management
for individuals are higher than those for institutions); Simon, Avoid Stock and Bond Funds,
supra note 20, at D10 (bond fund investment management fees average 0.65%, while pension
funds and other institutions pay 0.3% for fixed-income portfolio management); see also Ruth
Simon, How Funds Get Rich at Your Expense, MONEY, Feb. 1995, at 130, 132 [hereinafter
Simon, How Funds Get Rich] ("from 1971 to 1993 .... for every percentage point a typical
equity fund spent on expenses, its return dropped by 1.9 points").
22 Bid see Russ Wiles, Despite Surge in Earnings, Funds Decline to Cut Fees, CI.
SU-TEMs, Jan. 14, 1996, at 44 (increase in expenses is partly explained by new shareholder
services, increasing number of new small funds, and replacement of up-front "loads" with
12(b)(1) charges).
23 A possible measure of this decline in operating expenses may be the decline in
expenses of stock index funds. Because these provide roughly the same customer services as
actively managed funds (other than stock selection), it is reasonable to assume that a high
percentage of their costs arise from administrative and other operating expenses. The average
expense ratio of index funds matching the Standard and Poor's 500 Stock Price Index declined
from 1.24% in 1985 to 0.45% in 1994. See Gruber, supra note 13, at 789, 790.
24 See infra text accompanying notes 35-37.
25 See Sirri & Tufano, supra note 20, at 11.
26 See Donald L. Santini & Jack W. Aber, Investor Response to Mutual Fund Policy
Variables, 31 FIN. REV. 765, 767, 779 (1996).
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fund performance (though this correlation is weak2 7), the link between poor
performance and fund outflows is relatively weak. 28 The result is that fund
assets are somewhat "sticky." This apparent price-insensitivity is consistent
with surveys showing that fund investors are largely ignorant of the expenses
their funds charge. 29 Moreover, after fees are subtracted, the average mutual
fund does not outperform unmanaged market indices. 30 This phenomenon
appears especially significant in light of the documented and publicized inverse
correlation between expenses and fund performance, 31 as well as the high
liquidity of fund shares.32 Given the ease of exit for open-end shareholders
created by the redemption right, the apparent indifference of investors to a
factor that has the potential to affect future performance is difficult to explain. 33
The fact that investors continue to add money to funds despite evidence that
most actively managed funds do not beat comparable indexes also raises
questions. 34
Fund managers' earnings are consistent with the high and increasing fees
charged. Managers now enjoy a return on equity rivaled only by the most
27 See id. at 766.
28 See Keith C. Brown et al., Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of
Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry, 51 J. FIN. 85, 88 n.3 (1996) (citing a
study); Edward B. Rock, Foxes and Hen Houses?: Personal Trading by Mutual Fund
Managers, 73 WAsH. U. L.Q. 1601, 1618-19 (1995); Sirri & Tufano, supra note 20, at 11.
29 A survey by the SEC and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency found that
80% of fund investors knew nothing about the expenses charged by their largest fund. See
Zweig, supra note 20, at 65; see also No Mourners for the Deadman Funds, MUTUAL
FuNDs, June 1997, at 62 (fund that declined in value by 84% since 1993 had an expense ratio
of 25.6%); Updegrave, supra note 20, at 65 (82% of shareholders were satisfied with their
funds' returns, 28.5% said "they [did not] measure their fund's performance against
anything," and "28.9% and 27.1%, respectively, claimed they compared their funds' returns
to what they could earn in [certificates of deposit] or to a specific percentage").
30 See Yakou Amihud, Open-End Mutual Funds in the United States of America, in
FUNDS AND PORTFOuO MANAGEmENT INSrrrUTIoNs: AN INTERNATONAL SURVEY 171, 180
(Stefano Preda ed., 1991).
31 See, e.g., Christopher R. Blake et al., The Performance of Bond Mutual Funds, 66 J.
Bus. 371 (1993); Gruber, supra note 13, at 783; Zweig, supra note 20, at 64.
32 Transaction costs associated with exiting open-end funds are low because (1) the
shares may be sold without brokers and (2) it is possible to use sale proceeds to purchase
another fund, sometimes including a fund outside the family of the sold fund, by means of a
single telephone call. See INVEsIMENT Co. INsT., supra note 4, at 40-41.
33 See Rock, supra note 28, at 1626-27 (citing the possibility that the market for funds is
imperfect due to the lack of sophistication of shareholders and difficulty in evaluating funds
because they are composed of abstract legal rights).
34 See generally Blake et al., supra note 31; Gruber, supra note 13.
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profitable financial and industrial companies. 35 Even in the 1960s, when funds'
annual expenses were significantly lower than they are now, a report by the
Wharton School of Finance and Commerce found that fund advisers'
compensation was above the level one would expect in a competitive market.36
This is especially difficult to understand given the absence of barriers to entry
into the fund industry and economists' conclusion that at least the money-
market segment of the fund market is competitive. 37
Yet another puzzling aspect of the fund industry is the significant, persistent
discounts from net asset value at which closed-end funds typically trade.38
Economists and others have long been intrigued by the persistence of discounts,
but have yet to explain them satisfactorily.39 Like high fees, discounts represent
a problem that has resisted regulatory cures.40
35 Mutual funds' net profit margin is approximately 25 %, while that of the average U.S.
company is 7%. See Zweig, supra note 20, at 64, 70.
36 See WHARTON STUDY, H.R. REP. No. 87-2274, pt. 1, at 30 (1962); see also Simon,
How Funds Get Rich, supra note 21, at 131 (reporting mutual fund's fees substantially in
excess of expenses).
37 See BAUMOL ET AL., supra note 7, at 117; Phillip R. Mack, Recent Trends in the
Mutual Fund Industry, 79 FED. REs. BULL. 1001, 1004 (1993) (reporting that under
Department of Justice antitrust criteria, an industry with a "Herfindahl index" of less than
1000 is considered unconcentrated; the Herfindahl index for the mutual fund industry was 500
in 1984 and 380 in 1992); Wang, supra note 1, at 979 (concluding that "the absence of
redemption fees, high liquidity of mutual fund assets, and the exchange privileges within
some mutual fund complexes have resulted in higher investor mobility and a competitive
environment for mutual funds"; overcapacity and new competitors will create competitive
pressure).
38 See, e.g., Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of
"Discounted" Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLuM. L. REV. 891, 903 (1988)
("[D]iscounts on seasoned funds of 20% or more, persisting for five years or longer, have
been common."); Tim Quinson, Market for Closed End Funds Comes Up Short, DENVER
PosT, July 29, 1996, at E3 (reporting that 82% of the nation's 510 closed-end funds trade at a
discount); Russ Wiles, Test Water Before Leaping into Closed-End Fund, L.A. TIMEs, Nov.
19, 1995, at D4 (indicating that 84% of closed-end mutual funds were selling at a discount).
39 See SErH ANDERSON & JEFFERY BORN, CLOSED END INVESTIENT COMPANiES:
ISSUES AND ANSWERS 131-35 (1992); Kraakman, supra note 38, at 903 (discussing discounts
as a motivation for acquisitions); Burton G. Malldel, The Structure of Closed End Fund
Discounts Revisited, 21 J. PoRTFioUO MGMT. 32, 35 (1995) (listing economics literature
addressing the discount question); Burton G. Malkiel, The Valuation of Closed End
Investment Company Shares, 32 J. FIN. 847, 857-58 (1977).
40 See Request for Comments on Reform of the Regulation of Investment Companies,
Securities Act Release No. 6868, Exchange Act Release No. 28,124, Investment Company
Act Release No. 17,534, Investment Advisors Act Release No. 1234, International Series
Release No. 128, 55 Fed. Reg. 25,322, 25,331-32 (1990) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
270) [hereinafter Request for Comments].
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II. RESTRICTIONS ON INTERFUND INVESTMENTS
A. The Antipyramiding Provision
The Act comprehensively regulates many aspects of fund operations. 4 ' It
imposes detailed disclosure and substantive requirements affecting such issues
as corporate governance, capital structure, and permissible investments. 42 The
primary provision of the Act restricting investments by one mutual fund in
another is the "antipyramiding" provision, section 12(d)(1), which limits
investments by mutual funds in other funds.43
Section 12(d)(1)(A) 44 forbids any registered investment company from
41 Mutual funds fall within the Act's definitions of "investment company": "any issuer
which is, holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, in the
business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities," and
any issuer which is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing,
reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns or proposes to acquire
investment securities having a value exceeding 40% of the value of the issuer's total
assets (exclusive of Government securities and cash items) on an unconsolidated basis.
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A), (C) (West 1997).42 See generally 3 TAMAR FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS ch. 21
(1980 & Supp. 1998); 3 THOMAS LEE HAzEN, TREATSE ON THE LAW OF SncuRrrs
REGULATION §§ 17.1, 17.8 (3d ed. 1995).
43 For a detailed description of the antipyramiding provision, see 3 FRANKEL, supra note
42, at 242-56.
44 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d)(1)(A) (1994). Section 12(d)(1)(A) provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any registered investment company (the "acquiring
company") and any company or companies controlled by such acquiring company to
purchase or otherwise acquire any security issued by any other investment company (the
"acquired company"), and for any investment company (the "acquiring company") and
any company or companies controlled by such acquiring company to purchase or
otherwise acquire any security issued by any registered investment company (the
"acquired company"), if the acquiring company and any company or companies
controlled by it immediately after such purchase or acquisition own in the aggregate-
(1) more than 3 per centum of the total outstanding voting stock of the acquired
company;
(II) securities issued by the acquired company having an aggregate value in excess of 5
per centum of the value of the total assets of the acquiring company; or
(I) securities issued by the acquired company and all other investment companies (other
than Treasury stock of the acquiring company) having an aggregate value in excess of 10
per centm of the value of the total assets of the acquiring company.
1998]
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acquiring securities of any other investment company (whether registered or
not)45 if the acquiring company (in combination with other companies managed
by the same adviser)46 would as a result of the acquisition own:
(I) more than 3 % of the outstanding voting stock of the acquired company;
(11) shares of the acquired company with a value exceeding 5% of the acquiring
company's total assets; or
(m) shares of the acquired company which, in combination with shares of all
other investment companies, have an aggregate value exceeding 10% of the
total assets of the acquiring company. 7
Section 12(d)(1)(A) also forbids the converse: no investment company (whether
registered or not)48 may acquire shares of a registered investment company in
violation of any of these three conditions. However, section 12(d)(1)(A) does
not apply to purchases by an entity not required to register as an investment
company under the Act, of shares of another such entity. 49
Section 12(d)(1)(B) approaches interfund transactions from the viewpoint of
the investment company whose shares are being acquired. This provision
forbids a registered open-end investment company from selling its shares to
another investment company if the sale would cause the acquiring company to
own more than three percent of the acquired company's voting stock, or would
cause more than ten percent of the acquired company's voting stock to be
owned by all investment companies in the aggregate.5 0
45 The Act defines an investment company as any company that is or holds itself as
being engaged primarily in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities, or
"is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding,
or trading in securities, and owns or proposes to acquire investment securities having a value
exceeding 40 per centum of the value of such issuer's total assets .... " 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-
3(1)(A), (C) (West 1997). Investment companies are required to register with the SEC unless
they are excused from doing so by, e.g., sections 3(b), 3(c), or 7 of the Act. See Investment
Company Act Release No. 6440, 36 Fed. Reg. 8729, 8730 & n.4 (1971). But investment
companies not required to register nevertheless fall within the coverage of section
12(d)(1)(A). See id. at 8730 & nn.6-7.
46 See FundTrust, SEC No-Action Letter, May 26, 1987, available in LEXIS, FedSec
Library, NoAct File, 1987 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2085; OTF Equities, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, Nov. 14, 1975, available in LEXIS, FedSec Library, NoAct File, 1975 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 2526.
47 "[S]ecurities of... investment companies not registered under the Act are considered
for the purpose of determining whether the ten percent limitation is exceeded." See
Investment Company Act Release No. 6440, supra note 45, at 8730 & n.8.
48 See id.
49 See id.
50 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d)(1)(B) (1994).
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Section 12(d)(1)(C) controls investments in closed-end funds. This
subsection makes it unlawful for any investment company to acquire shares of a
registered closed-end investment company if, as a result of the transaction, the
acquiring company and its affiliates would together own more than ten percent
of the voting stock of the closed-end company. 51 The acquiring companies
subject to this restriction include both closed- and open-end funds, and both
registered investment companies and those not required to register. 52
Sections 12(d)(1)(E), (F), (G), and (J) provide exceptions from the
restrictions of sections 12(d)(1)(A)-(C). Section 12(d)(1)(F) eliminates the
restrictions in section 12(d)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii)-which focus on the size of the
investment in relation to the acquiring company-if the acquiring and the
acquired funds comply with certain conditions. 53 To use the exemption, the
acquiring fund (together with its affiliates) 54 must limit its investment to three
percent of the acquired company's stock.55 The acquiring company also must
not sell its own shares to the public using a sales load above 1.5%.56 In
addition, if an acquisition in reliance on this exemption takes place, two
consequences arise: (1) the acquired fund is absolved of any obligation to
redeem its shares in an amount exceeding one percent of its assets during any
thirty-day period, 57 and (2) the acquiring fund is required to vote its shares of
the acquired fund either according to the instructions of the acquiring fund's
shareholders or in proportion to the vote of other shareholders of the acquired
fund. 58 Because section 12(d)(1)(F) is available only if the acquiring company is
a registered investment company, 59 unregistered investment companies such as
foreign funds and private investment funds6° must still comply with these
restrictions.
Section 12(d)(1)(E) permits a fund to acquire shares of another fund if the
51 See id. § 80a-12(d)(1)(C).
52 See Investment Company Act Release No. 6440, supra note 45, at 8730.
53 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-12(d)(1)(F) (West 1997).
54 "Affiliate" is defined in § 2(a)(3) of the Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3) (1994). The
SEC views the fact that two funds are managed by a common adviser as providing a
"strong," though not determinative, indication that the fimds are affiliates, resulting in
aggregation of their holdings for purposes of § 12(d)(1). See FundTrust, supra note 46.
55 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-12(d)(1)(F)(i) (West 1997).
56 See id. § 80a-12(d)(1)(F)(ii).
57 See id. § 80a-12(d)(1)(F).
58 See id. §§ 80a-12(d)(1)(F), 12(d)(1)(E)(iii)(aa).
59 See id. § 80a-12(d)(1)(F).
60 See infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
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acquired shares are the only security owned by the acquiring fund.61 This
exemption has allowed the creation of "master-feeder" funds-funds whose
only shareholders are other investment companies, which in turn offer shares to
the public. 62
Section 12(d)(1)(G) is a new exception to the antipyramiding provision that
allows the creation of "hub-and-spoke" funds.63 These are mutual funds that
invest entirely in the shares of other funds in the same fund group. Finally,
section 12(d)(1)(J) permits the SEC to exempt interfund transactions from the
strictures of section 12(d)(1). 64
B. Additional Restrictions on Interfund Transactions: Section 17
In addition to section 12(d)(1), section 17 of the Act also effectively
restricts interfund acquisitions. Section 17(a) makes it unlawful for an "affiliated
person" of a registered investment company to sell securities to, or purchase
securities from, the company.65 An investment company that owns five percent
or more of the stock of another investment company or otherwise controlled it
(e.g., through shared officers or directors) would be an affiliate of the latter,66
as would the manager of the acquiring company and other funds managed by
that adviser.67 In addition, Rule 17d-1 under the Act68 prohibits joint
arrangements or enterprises between investment companies and affiliated
persons. Once they are deemed affiliated, further investments by the acquiring
fund are prohibited. 69
These provisions present numerous obstacles for interfund acquisitions.
Once the five percent threshold is passed, no further purchases or sales by
either fund of shares of the other fund would be allowed without SEC
61 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-12(d)(1)(E)(ii) (West 1997).
62 See, e.g., South Asia Portfolio, SEC No-Action Letter, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,331, at 77,671 (Mar. 12, 1997).
63 See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
64 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d)(1)(J) (1994).
65 See id. § 80a-17(a)(1), (a)(2), (b)(1). See generally 3 HAZEN, supra note 42, § 17.7,
at 207-10.
66 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3)(A); see also The Phoenix Funds, SEC No-Action
Letter, Oct. 28, 1991, available in LEXIS, FedSec Library, NoAct File, 1991 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 1273; Vanguard STAR Fund et al., SEC No-Action Letter, 60 Fed. Reg. 50,656,
50,659 (1995).
67 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3)(C).
68 17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-1(a) (1997).
69 See id. Purchases by the target fund of shares of the acquiring fund would also be
prohibited. See id.
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exemption. In addition, by causing the funds to become affiliates, a five percent
acquisition would prevent "joint transactions" and "joint enterprises" by the
funds. The uncertainty created by the notoriously vague contours of these terms
would throw many areas of fund operations into question.70 This prohibition
might, for example, forbid the funds from investing in stock of the same
company. 71
III. HISTORY OF THE ANTlPYRAMIDING PROVISION
A. The Adoption of the Act in 1940
The Act was one of several Depression-era laws designed to combat the
perceived evils of concentrated control over money and business.72 As
Professor Roe has explained, a political consensus of the 1930s-and one that
still resonates today73-held that "organized money" controlled too much of the
nation's business, granting it excessive political power.74 This political attitude
gave rise to an array of statutes designed to directly limit the ability of "Wall
Street financiers" to control the nation's industries and to do so indirectly by
imposing restraints on the size and power of banks, mutual funds, and other
financial institutions. 75
As applied to mutual funds, the legislative agenda addressing the perceived
problem of concentration of financial power took several forms. Although
funds' domination of banks and operating companies (i.e., corporations other
than mutual funds) was the major fear,76 the concentrated control of mutual
70 See 3 HAzEN, supra note 42, § 17.7.
71 See, e.g., SEC v. Midwest Technical Dev. Corp., [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 91,252, at 94,147 (D. Minn. 1963); cf Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier
Kraakman, Investment Companies as Guardian Shareholders: The Place of the MSIC in the
Corporate Governance Debate, 45 STAN. L. Rnv. 985, 1001 (1993).
72 See, e.g., COMMrITEE ON BANING & CURRENcY, STocK ExCHANGE PRACTICFS, S.
REP. No. 73-1455, at 333-34 (1934) (known as the "Pecora Report," the report stated that
"[tihe investment company [has become] the instnrentality of financiers and industrialists to
facilitate acquisition of concentrated control of the wealth and industries of the country.").
73 See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91
COLUM. L. REv. 10, 44 (1991) [hereinafter Roe, Political Theory]; House Panel Backs Some
Miring for Banking and Commerce, N.Y. TIMEs, June 18, 1997, at D8 (reporting Rep.
Leach's concern for "concentration of economic power").
74 See Mark J. Roe, Political Elements in the Creation of a Mutual Fund Industry, 139
U. PA. L. REv. 1469, 1469-70, 1491-92 (1991) [hereinafter Roe, Political Elements]; Roe,
Political Theory, supra note 73, at 19-21.
75 See Roe, Political Elements, supra note 74, at 1485.
76 See id. at 1469.
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funds by fund holding companies was also a concern. 77 Congress believed a
fund holding company might exercise excessive influence over the funds in
which it had invested, the companies whose securities the underlying funds
owned, and the securities markets generally.78 Even though mutual funds were
then only small players in the financial arena,79 the size of mutual funds was a
concern: the SEC sought to prevent all funds from exceeding $150 million in
assets.80 Though this proposal was not accepted, Congress did authorize the
SEC to monitor the growth of mutual funds and conduct studies to determine
whether their growth could lead to excessive concentration of wealth or
otherwise could harm the public interest.81
Another reason for Congress's hostility toward interfund investments was
its concern that the holding company structure and the "layering" of fees
resulted in higher total fees for shareholders of the holding company. 82 The
SEC reported to Congress that shareholders in the top tier of a fund holding
company paid higher total costs because they in effect paid for the charges-
advisory fees, administrative expenses, and sales loads-of both the fund they
owned directly and the funds it owned.83 Congress also believed that the
"undue organizational complexities"84 of fund holding companies made it
difficult for unsophisticated shareholders to understand and evaluate their
77 See Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b)(4) (1994) (public interest
is adversely affected when "control of investment companies is unduly concentrated through
pyramiding or inequitable methods of control, or is inequitably distributed"); Investment
Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on H.R. 10065 Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 112-13, 238-39 (1940)
[hereinafter Hearings] (statement of David Schenker, Chief Counsel, Investment Trust Study,
SEC) (section 12(d)(1) is intended to prevent "abuses" including "the acquiring fund
imposing undue influence over the management of the acquired funds through ... the
acquisition by the acquiring company of voting control of the acquired company"); HUGH
BULLOCK, ThE STORY OF INvESTMENT COMPANMS 34-36, 84 (1959).
78 See PPI REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 89-2337, at 317 (1966).
79 See LoUIS Loss & JOEL SEUGMAN, SEcuarnms REGULATION, Ch. 1.H.6.c (1996).
80 See Hearings, supra note 77, at 188, 375, 400-01, 412; Roe, Political Elements,
supra note 74, at 1469.
8 1 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-14(b) (directing the SEC to study whether growth of funds
affects "concentration of control of wealth and industry"). This study became the Wharton
Study, supra note 12. See also Investment Company Act Release No. 2729, June 13, 1958,
available in LEXIS, FedSec Library, SecRel File, 1958 SEC LEXIS 399.
82 See Hearings, supra note 77, at 238 (statement of David Schenker); 76 CONG. REc.
S2844 (Mar. 14, 1940) (remarks of Sen. Wagner); 3 FRANKEL, supra note 42, at 238.
83 See Vanguard STAR Fund et al., supra note 66; 3 FRANKEL, supra note 42, at 238.
84 Hearings, supra note 77, at 238-39 (statement of David Schenker); 76 CONG. REC.
S2844-45 (Mar. 14, 1940) (remarks of Sen. Wagner).
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investments. 85
Conflicts of interest perceived to arise when one fund owned a significant
stake in another were an additional concern.86 The main problem envisioned
was the damage to the underlying fund caused by large redemptions or threats
of redemptions by the acquiring fund.87 The Act expressed these fears by
declaring that "the national public interest and the interest of investors are
adversely affected" when "investment companies are ... managed in the
interest of other investment companies ... rather than in the interest of all
classes of such companies' security holders." 88 Similar concerns led to the
inclusion of section 17(a) in the Act. Congress adopted that section to
"protect[ ] 'minority interests from exploitation by insiders of their strategic
position' and assure[ ] that interested persons deal with the investment company
'at arm's length in an endeavor to secure the best possible bargain for their
respective stockholders. "89
The SEC's original draft of section 12(d)(1) prohibited an investment
company from acquiring any securities of another investment company. 9° The
industry supported strict limitations on interfund acquisitions. However, the
SEC and the industry agreed to allow limited interfund investments, because
such investments might represent a source of profits for funds and apparently
because the problem of fund holding companies was not believed to be
significant. 91 Thus, the antipyramiding provision adopted in 1940 prohibited an
investment company from purchasing more than five percent of the voting stock
of another investment company whose investments were concentrated in a
single industry, or more than three percent of the voting stock of any other type
of investment company. 92 This provision did not limit the fraction of the
acquiring company's assets that could be invested in other investment
85 See T. Rowe Price Spectrum Fund, Inc., et al., Notice of Application, 60 Fed. Reg.
50,654, 50,655 (1995); cf Alfred Jaretzki, Jr., The Investment Company Act of 1940, 26
WAsH. U. L.Q. 303, 325 (1941).
86 See Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b)(2) (1994).
87 See Hearings, supra note 77, at 780-81 (statement of Prof. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr.);
PPI REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 89-2337, at 311-24 (1966). For further discussion of this issue,
see infra text accompanying notes 106-12 and Part V.A.
88 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b)(2).
89 3 HAzEN, supra note 42, § 17.7, at 204 (footnote omitted) (quoting E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 60 n.6 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
90 See Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 10 (1940); 3 FRANKEL, supra note 42, at 238.
91 See Hearings, supra note 77, at 1055; 3 FRANKEL, supra note 42, at 239.
92 See Investment Company Act of 1940 § 12(d)(1), ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789, 809 (current
version at 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-12(d)(1) (West 1997)).
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companies. 93 In addition, the provision applied only to purchases by registered
investment companies. 94
B. 1970 Amendment
Congress amended the Act in 1970 following the SEC's delivery of a
report ("PPI Report") recommending legislative remedies to address a number
of perceived fund industry problems. 95 One such problem was the growth of
fund holding companies since the 1930s. The SEC's concerns about this growth
fell into two categories. Its primary concern was with the growth of foreign
fund holding companies, in particular Fund of Funds Ltd. ("Fund of Funds"),
the largest such holding company then in operation.96 Fund of Funds was an
open-end investment company incorporated in Ontario, headquartered in
Geneva, and sponsored by IOS Ltd. (S.A.), a Panamanian corporation also
headquartered in Geneva. 97 The SEC was concerned about the rapid growth
and absolute size of Fund of Funds. Its assets exceeded $420 million, 98 at a
time when the entire industry's assets were about $38 billion. 99 Fund of Funds
owned one-hundred percent of the shares of four domestic funds, more than
thirty percent of the shares of eight other domestic funds, and part of several
mutual fund management companies. 100 Fund of Funds' investments in U.S.
funds were possible because, as noted above, before 1970, section 12(d)(1) did
not restrict interfund investments by investment companies exempt from the
Act's registration requirement, such as foreign funds. 101
The SEC's second concern was with the appearance of fund holding
companies that owned open-end funds. Fund holding companies in the 1930s
owned only closed-end companies.' 02 The SEC was concerned, as it had been
during adoption of the 1940 Act, that this new type of holding company might
"exert undue influence or control over" the open-end funds in which it owned
93 See id.
94 See id.
95 See PPI REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 89-2337 (1966). See generally Loss & SEUGMAN,
supra note 79, at ch. 1.H.6.c.
96 See PPI REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 89-2337, at 312.
97 See id.
98 See id. at 312-13.
99 See Investment Company Act Release No. 4766, Dec. 2, 1966, available in LEXIS,
FedSec Library, SecRel File, 1966 SEC LEXIS 377, at *2.
100 See PPI REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 89-2337, at 312-14; Richard Phalon, Funds
Investing in Others Scored, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1966, at 63.
101 See PPI REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 89-2337, at 312.
102 See id. at 311 n.16.
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shares. 103 The SEC believed this control might enable the holding company to
take controlling positions in securities held by its portfolio funds if several of
those funds held stakes in a single issuer-giving the holding company influence
not only over the underlying issuers but also over the stock market in
general.' 04 Such control was especially worrisome, the SEC said, when the
holding company was foreign, since foreign companies could hide their
owners' identities from U.S. authorities.105
The primary problem the SEC identified as resulting from holding
company influence at this time was large redemptions or threats of redemption
by the holding company.' 06 The SEC theorized-without citing any historical
evidence-that the holding company, by threat of redemption or directly
through the acquisition of voting control, might induce a portfolio fund to
change its investment policies from those adopted by the fund manager. 107 The
SEC also accepted the ICI's argument that a fund with a significant holding
company investor would be forced to anticipate a large redemption by the
holding company by taking steps such as keeping a large percentage of its assets
in cash or liquidating a large chunk of its assets in a short time. 108 The ICI
contended the latter action would work against other shareholders' interests
because of the need to hold nonoptimal amounts in cash and because of the
losses from a distress sale. 10 9 These problems, the SEC believed, could be
magnified when the holding company shareholders were foreign entities
because their redemption behavior would be influenced by foreign political and
economic developments "not really relevant to investment in domestic mutual
funds."" 0 In addition, the SEC contended that foreign investors' redemption
10 3 Id. at 315; see also Frank Russell Investment Companies, SEC No-Action Letter,
Jan. 3, 1984, available in LEXIS, FedSec Library, NoAct File, 1984 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
1517 (allowing Canadian pension funds to acquire more than 3% of registered mutual funds
on the condition that the pension fund would not seek to control or change policies of
underlying funds).
104 See PPI REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 89-2337, at 315-17.
105 See id. at 312; Phalon, supra note 100, at 63.
10 6 See PPI REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 89-2337, at 315; see also Roe, Political Theory,
supra note 73, at 19.
107 See PPI REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 89-2337, at 316; see also Bancroft Convertible
Fund, Inc. v. Zico Investment Holdings, Inc., 825 F.2d 731, 738-39 (3d Cir. 1987);
Clemente Global Growth Fund, Inc. v. Pickens, 705 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (target
fund has an interest in preventing the acquiring fund from "radically alter[ing] the [target]
Fund's investment objectives and policies").
108 See PPI REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 89-2337, at 316-17.
109 See id. at 317.
110 Id. at 318.
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behavior was likely to affect several foreign fund holding companies
simultaneously, and thus to have multiplier effects on U.S. markets.111 It
appears the SEC's opinion about the harmful potential of foreign fund holding
companies was influenced by the well-publicized securities law violations of
Fund of Funds and by the holding company's ultimate collapse. 112
The SEC was also concerned about "the unnecessary layering of costs" 113
that it believed was inherent in the holding company structure.114 Investors in a
fund holding company, the SEC believed, faced the prospect of paying advisory
and administrative expenses, as well as sales loads, of both the holding
company and its portfolio funds. The evidence the SEC cited to demonstrate the
extent of the problem was, once again, Fund of Funds. The problem of
layering of fees exacerbated the general problem of excessive fees paid by all
fund investors. 115
To remedy these perceived problems, the SEC for the second time
proposed that section 12(d)(1) be tightened by applying it to foreign holding
companies and eliminating its exception for interfund investments below three
or five percent of the target's shares; under the SEC's proposal, interfund
investments would have been flatly prohibited.'1 6 The ICI opposed elimination
of the three to five percent exception, but did not oppose application of section
12(d)(1) to unregistered investment companies. 117 After years of legislative
efforts, Congress accepted the ICI's approach, preserving the exception for
small investments but extending the prohibition to unregistered funds.118
Congress also created a new exemption for "master-feeder" funds." 19
111 See id.
112 See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975); In the
Matter of I.O.S., Ltd., et al., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8083, May 23, 1967,
available in LEXIS, FedSec Library, SecRel File, 1967 SEC LEXIS 521; Cornfeld Group to
End U.S. Deals, N.Y. Tom, May 25, 1967, at 67; Fund of Funds Loses a Round, N.Y.
TnvMs, Oct. 5, 1966, at 61; Rampant Capitalist Who Made Up His Own Rules: Obituary qf
Bernie Cornfeld, FIN. TIMaS (London), Mar. 2, 1995, at 4; David Yee, The Ghost of Bernie
Cornfeld, FIN. WORLD, Apr. 25, 1995, at 71.
113 See PPI REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 89-2337, at 319-20. The SEC contended that the
excessiveness of these charges resulted from the absence of price competition in mutual fund
marketing.
114 See Investment Company Act Release No. 4766, supra note 99.
115 See WHARTON STUDy, H.R. REP. No. 87-2274, pt. 1, at 28-32 (1962).
116 See PPI REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 89-2337, at 323.
117 See Hearings on S.1659 Before Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 316-17 (1967).
118 See Investment Company Act Release No. 6440, supra note 45, at 8730 & n.8.
119 See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
[Vol. 59:507
MUTUAL FUND ANIPYRAMIDING PROVISION
C. 1996 Amendment
The National Securities Market Improvements Act of 1996120 added an
additional exemption to section 12(d)(1). The new exemption, section
12(d)(1)(G), 121 allows funds to purchase shares of other funds in excess of the
three percent limit in section 12(d)(1)(A) if both funds are part of a single
"group" of funds-e.g., a fund "family" like Fidelity or Dreyfus' 22-and if the
parent fund's only assets are shares of funds in the group to which the parent
belongs. The exemption is available only for open-end funds that own shares of
other open-end funds. 123 This amendment codified previous SEC no-action
120 Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.A. and 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002).
121 The new exemption, section 12(d)(1)(G), provides:
(G)(i) This paragraph does not apply to securities of a registered open-end
investment company or a registered unit investment trust (hereinafter in this
subparagraph referred to as the "acquired company") purchased or otherwise acquired
by a registered open-end company or a registered unit investment trust (hereinafter in
this subparagraph referred to as the "acquiring company") if-
(1) the acquired company and the acquiring company are part of the same
group of investment companies;
(I) the securities of the acquired company, securities of other registered open-
end investment companies and registered unit investment trusts that are part of the
same group of investment companies, Government securities, and short-term paper
are the only investments held by the acquiring company;
(H1) with respect to-
(aa) securities of the acquired company, the acquiring company does not
pay and is not assessed any charges or fees for distribution-related activities,
unless the acquiring company does not charge a sales load or other fees or
charges for distribution-related activities; or
(bb) securities of the acquiring company, any sales loads and other
distribution-related fees charged, when aggregated with any sales load and
distribution-related fees paid by the acquiring company with respect to
securities of the acquired fund, are not excessive under rules adopted pursuant
to [certain sections of] this title, or the Commission;
(IV) the acquired company has a policy that prohibits it from acquiring any
securities of registered open-end companies or registered unit investment trusts in
reliance on this subparagraph or subparagraph (F); ....
National Securities Market Improvements Act of 1996, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-12(d)(1)(G) (West
1997).
122 Ile amendment defines a fund group as two or more funds that "hold themselves out
to investors as related companies for purposes of investment and investor services." Id. § 80a-12()()(i().
123 See id. § 80a-12(d)(1)(G)(i). In addition, the acquired fund's right to own shares of
other funds is limited and the aggregate sales loads and other distribution fees charged by the
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positions allowing the creation of "hub-and-spoke" funds. 124
The 1996 amendment also empowered the SEC to grant exemptions to
section 12(d)(1). 125 Congress directed the SEC to slowly expand the types of
fund holding company arrangements that would qualify for this exemption, yet
to continue to protect investors by forbidding arrangements giving rise to the
abuses that originally motivated section 12(d)(1), such as "conflicts of interest
and overreaching by a participant in the arrangement." 126 As an example of the
type of situation in which the SEC might use its exemptive authority, the
committee report cites funds not part of a large fund group; unlike large fund
complexes, such funds cannot create a fund of funds unless they own shares in
unaffiliated funds. 127 The SEC to date has narrowly interpreted its authority
under this provision. 128
The changes to the antipyramiding provision were not a major focus of
legislative debate concerning the 1996 amendment. The ICI appears to have
been the only interest group to have taken a position on antipyramiding issues
during debate on the 1996 amendment. 129 The argument in support of the new
two funds must not be excessive. See id. § 80a-12(d)(l)(G)(i)(ll), (mll)(bb).
124 See "Hub-and-Spoke" Funds: A Report Prepared by the Division of Investment
Management, enclosure to Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of
Representatives, SEC No-Action Letter, Apr. 15, 1992, available in LEXIS, FedSec
Library, NoAct File, 1993 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 766 [hereinafter "Hub-and-Spoke
Report"]. The no-action letters had allowed interfund investments if both funds were
"part of a group of investment companies which holds itself out to investors as related
companies for purposes of investment and investor services" and obtained management,
administrative, and distribution services from a common entity. See, e.g., T. Rowe
Price Spectrum Fund, Inc., Investment Company Act Release No. 21,425, Oct. 18,
1995, available in LEXIS, FedSec Library, SecRel File, 1995 SEC LEXIS 2857;
Vanguard STAR Fund, Investment Company Act Release No. 21,426, Oct. 18, 1995,
available in LEXIS, FedSec Library, SecRel File, 1995 SEC LEXIS 2860.
Before enactment of the 1996 amendment, 37 such funds existed. See Alejandro
Bodipo-Memba, "Fund of Funds, " Sullied by 1960s Fiasco, Will Get Shot in Arm from
Securities Bill, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 1996, at Cl.
12 5 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-12(d)(1)(J) (West 1997).
126 H.R. REP. No. 104-622, at 44 (1996).
127 See id. at 43.
128 See, e.g., SBSF Funds, Inc., d/b/a Key Mutual Funds et al., Notice of Application,
Investment Company Act Release Nos. 22,486, 812-10164, Jan. 30, 1997, available in
LEXIS, FedSec Library, SecRel File, 1997 SEC LEXIS 227; Liberty Term Trust, Inc.-1999,
Investment Company Act Release Nos. 22,465, 812-10404, 62 Fed. Reg. 3066 (1997).
12 9 See Institute Supports Bill Modernizing Fund Regulation, ICI News Release, Apr. 7,
1995 (supporting Rep. Fields's Investment Company Act Amendments of 1995, the
antipyramiding provisions which were similar to the final 1996 amendment); Congressional
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"hub-and-spoke" exemption cited the potential benefits shareholders of the
holding company could derive from its investment in other funds. The
perceived advantages were (1) the holding company could benefit from the
services of specialized managers (e.g., advisers knowledgeable in foreign
markets) selected by the manager of the holding company fund and
(2) shareholders of the holding company could enjoy the advantages of
additional diversification. 130 These goals fit within the Act's overall stated
purpose of improving the efficiency of the capital markets. 131 Congress also
was apparently persuaded that the restrictions the SEC had imposed on
affiliated "hub-and-spoke" funds were adequate to address the problems the
antipyramiding provision sought to address, "such as overly complex corporate
structures and excessive distribution fees. "132
Yet despite this deregulatory rhetoric, the 1996 amendment significantly
tightened the antipyramiding provision in another respect. Before the 1996
amendment, although the Act's language was ambiguous, it had been
interpreted as applying the antipyramiding provision to private investment
funds-those generally with fewer than 100 investors. 133 The 1996 amendment
extended the provision's coverage to include such private funds as well as a
new category of private funds created by the 1996 amendment. 134
IV. THE RATIONALE FOR THE ANTIPYRAMIDING PROVSION
A detailed comparison of the stated rationale for adoption of section
12(d)(1), as set forth in the legislative history for the original Act and its
amendments, with the structure and language of the provision indicates
significant divergences between the two. The following discussion summarizes
the major policy arguments put forward by supporters of section 12(d)(1)-
harms from redemption pressures, concentration of financial power, layering of
fees, and undue organizational complexities-and examines whether the
Hearings on HR 1495, The ICA Amendments of 95, ICI memorandum, Nov. 8, 1995 (fund
representative supporting expansion of fund-of-fund exemption limited to fund families).130 See 141 CONG. REc. E868 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 1995) (remarks of Rep. Fields).
131 The 1996 amendment was designed -to promote more efficient management of
mutual funds, protect investors, and provide more effective and less burdensome
regulation... ." H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-864, at 39 (1996).
132 S. RP. No. 104-293, at 7 (1996); see H. REP. No. 104-622, at 43 (1996) (provision
preventing hub-and-spoke funds from investing in unaffiliated funds "is intended to avoid
overly complex inter-corporate structures").133 See Clemente Global Growth Fund, Inc. v. Pickens, 705 F. Supp. 958, 964
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
134 See Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(c)(1), (c)(7)(C) (1994).
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provision as drafted addresses these arguments.
A. Redemption Pressure on Portfolio Funds
As shown above, harms resulting from redemption pressures were a
significant concern of the proponents of the antipyramiding provision. The
concern was that, in the event the holding company redeemed its holdings in
the portfolio fund en masse, the portfolio fund might be forced to sell its assets
in a hasty manner. 135 This might produce low sale prices, hurting other
shareholders of the portfolio fund. In addition, the mere knowledge that a large-
scale redemption was possible might force the subsidiary fund to maintain a
larger cash position than its investment strategy would otherwise dictate. In
either event, shareholders of the portfolio fund might suffer.
Congress also feared that large-scale redemptions by the holding company
might have a domino effect on the securities markets generally. 136 The fear was
especially great when the holding company was foreign, because it was thought
that allowing significant ownership of U.S. funds by foreign entities could
expose U.S. markets to the volatility of foreign markets. 137 The well-publicized
collapse of Fund of Funds and its affiliates contributed to the belief that
pyramiding involving foreign holding companies could endanger the stability of
the U.S. financial system. 138
Yet history and logic seem not to bear these fears out. First, the Act
already contains several provisions designed to address the problems that may
result from large, rapid redemptions. These include liquidity requirements; 139
135 See, e.g., South Asia Portfolio, supra note 62, at 77,673 ("the undue influence over
the adviser of the controlled company through the threat of large scale redemptions and loss of
advisory fees to the adviser, resulting in the disruption of the orderly management of the
company through the maintenance of large cash balances to meet potential
redemptions .... ").
136 Cy Rock, supra note 28, at 1617-18 (the SEC's desire to preserve the fund
industry's appearance of integrity so that investors maintain confidence, thereby preserving
the social benefits of the fund industry).
137 See PPI REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 89-2337, at 318 (1966).
138 See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987-89 (2d Cir. 1975)
(expert testimony that the IOS collapse resulted in a deterioration of domestic and foreign
investor confidence, causing a "steep decline" in foreign purchases of U.S. securities,
increased redemption of mutual fund shares, and a ripple effect that depressed the prices of
American securities).
139 To ensure that open-end funds have sufficient liquid assets to provide cash for
redemptions, a maximum of 15% of such a fund's assets (10% for money market funds) may
be invested in illiquid securities. See Robert A. Robertson & Bradley W. Paulson, A
Methodology for Mutual Fund Derivative Investments, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 237, 244
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investment limitations; 140 debt restrictions; 141 the ability to make pro rata
distributions of unliquidated assets in emergency situations; 142 and the ability to
suspend redemptions altogether in special situations.' 43
Second, market pressures already create incentives for managers of both
parent and portfolio funds to prepare for the potentially harmful effects of
redemptions. 44 For the manager of the portfolio fund, the most obvious
incentive to minimize redemptions is that management fees (and perquisites) are
in general proportional to fund size. 145 In addition, if, as antipyramiding
proponents assert, rapid redemptions may force distress selling of fund assets,
managers have an incentive to prepare for or avoid such redemptions so as to
enjoy the marketing benefits of a good performance record. 46 Among the tools
available for doing so are maintaining liquidity in excess of legal requirements;
establishing bank lines of credit; emergency borrowing; lending securities and
cash between funds in a group; and imposing redemption fees or restrictions.' 47
(1995). "An asset is 'illiquid' if a fund cannot sell the asset in the ordinary course of business
within seven days at the approximate price at which the fund has valued the asset." Id.
140 Funds calling themselves diversified may invest no more than 5% of their assets in
the securities of a single issuer, and may not own more than 10% of the outstanding securities
of a single issuer. See Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b)(1) (1994).
Though couched as diversification requirements, these restrictions have the effect of
increasing the liquidity of a diversified fund's investments because large blocks of stock of a
single issuer are generally difficult to sell.
141 Section 18 of the Act prohibits registered investment companies from issuing senior
debt securities, with some exceptions. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(a), (f), (g). Because funds are
generally not leveraged, the spill-over effects from a fund's collapse (e.g., due to large
redemptions by its parent fund) are lower than, for example, those resulting from a bank
failure. See Roe, Political Elements, supra note 74, at 1504.
142 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(32).
143 See id. § 80a-22(e)(2).
144 See T. Rowe Price Spectrum Fund, Inc., et al., Notice of Application, supra note
85, at 50,656 (portfolio funds "have maintained sufficient cash positions to satisfy all
redemptions made by the Spectrum Fund"); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control:
The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1277 (1991) (to be
prepared for redemptions, preservation of maximum liquidity must remain a high priority for
the rational mutual fund manager).
145 See Ajay Khorana, Sunil Wahal, & Marc Zenner, Why Do Firms Issue Equity?:
Rights Issues in the Closed-End Funds Industry (Nov. 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
146 See Edward Wyatt, To Fight a Crash, Funds Buttress Their Cash, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 24, 1995, § 3, at 1.
147 See Tarum Chordia, The Structure of Mutual Fund Charges, 41 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 7,
32 (1996) (back-end fees dissuade redemptions); Charles Gasparino, Mutual Funds Have
Cash on Hand to Meet Withdrawals, MIN.-ST. PAUL STAR TRm., July 21, 1996, at 4D. See
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In the PPI Report, the SEC appears to have concluded that the mechanisms
available to funds to insulate themselves from redemption risks, though deemed
adequate in the context of a single-tier fund, are inadequate in the context of a
fund holding company. The SEC appears to have based this conclusion on the
assumption that a fund holding company would be a less steady investor than,
for example, an individual or another institutional investor because (1) the fund
holding company might be forced to redeem its shares in the portfolio fund due
to its statutory obligation to meet redemption demands from its own
shareholders, 148 or (2) the fund holding company was a foreign fund. 149
But the PPI Report made little attempt to support these assumptions.
Moreover, in related contexts, the SEC has accepted the argument that conflicts
between the interests of parent and portfolio funds can be managed even when
the portfolio fund is not wholly owned by the parent.' 50 The SEC has also
recognized the ability of liquidity requirements to protect against problems that
might arise from redemption risks created by interfund investments. 151
There is little reason to assume that funds are more likely to recklessly
redeem their investment in another fund en masse than would other institutional
investors.152 Yet the Act does not set limits on these entities' ownership of
funds, and the SEC has been sanguine about the likelihood of institutional
generally Periodic Repurchases by Closed-End Management Investment Companies;
Redemptions by Open-End Management Investment Companies and Registered Separate
Accounts at Periodic Intervals or With Extended Payment, Securities Act Release No. 6948,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 30,967, Investment Company Act Release No. 18,869,
57 Fed. Reg. 34,701 (1992); E.F. Hutton Investment Series, Filing of Application,
Investment Company Act Release No. 12,079, 46 Fed. Reg. 60,703, 60,705 (1981)
(contingent deferred sales load deducted for redemptions within designated period).
148 The holding company, if a registered fund, would be obligated by section 22(e) of
the Act to redeem its securities within seven days. See Investment Company Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (1994). As discussed below, it was also feared that the holding company
might choose to redeem as a means of pressuring the portfolio fund into changing certain
policies.
149 See supra text accompanying note 111.
150 See Brinson Relationship Funds et al., Investment Company Act Release No.
22,204, 61 Fed. Reg. 48,515, 48,517 (1996).
151 See Vanguard STAR Fund et al., supra note 66, at 50,659 (stating that because
portfolios are 85% invested in liquid securities, "they would have no reason to hold a higher
than normal cash position to protect their other shareholders against potential redemptions by"
the spoke).
152 Among the institutions investing in mutual funds are insurance companies,
corporations, nonprofit organizations, and fiduciaries (banks and individuals serving as
trustees, guardians, and administrators). See INvrmiN= Co. INsT., supra note 4, at 95.
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investors creating redemption problems. 153 The parent fund, like any other
institutional investor, has some incentive not to redeem en masse if doing so
might force distress selling by its portfolio fund. This is because the investing
fund would usually suffer pro rata in any diminution in value experienced by
the portfolio fund.
Second, the proponents of the antipyramiding provision failed to cite any
evidence that redemption pressures of the severity needed to cause the harms
envisaged in the Act's legislative history are likely or even reasonably possible.
Even during major market drops, fund redemptions have remained quite
low. 154 When combined with the relative performance-insensitivity of fund
shareholders 155 and the liquidity requirements and other protections discussed
above, 156 the likelihood that redemptions could harm minority shareholders
seems low.
The fears that a foreign fund is especially likely to put redemption pressure
on U.S. funds it owns seem equally questionable. Section 12(d)(1) singles out
foreign funds for special restrictions, by making them ineligible for
subparagraph 12(d)(1)(F)'s exemption from 12(d)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii) restrictions
(i.e., a foreign fund may in no case invest more than five percent of its assets in
a single U.S. fund or more than ten percent in all U.S. funds). 157 Yet little
evidence exists that foreign funds would not be dissuaded from making
massive, rapid redemptions by the market considerations discussed above or
that their investment behavior has in fact been more volatile than that of U.S.
153 See Hub-and-Spoke Report, supra note 124, at 9.
154 The largest net outflow of fund assets during the 1944 to 1995 period was in
response to the October 1987 market drop. See NvsrmE Co. INST., MUTUAL FUND FACr
BooK 45 (37th ed. 1997). During the weeks following the crash, 4.5% of total equity fund
assets were liquidated, but only 5% of shareholders redeemed during this time. See id. During
the eight other stock market declines from 1977 through 1990, the largest one-month outflow
from stock funds was 1.1% of total stock assets. See id.; see also Carole Gould, Will the
Dominoes Fall?, N.Y. TIMEs, July 27, 1997, § 3, at 9 (noting that the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York Economic Policy Review Study concludes that a 1% stock market drop is likely
to result in redemption of less than 0.1% of mutual fund assets).
An individual fund might experience outflows greater than the low industry-wide figures.
Yet historical examples of redemption-induced panics that harmed shareholders are hard to
find. In addition, a fund holding company may be less susceptible to market volatility because
its portfolio would be more diversified than those of its portfolio funds. See supra note 181;
cf. Vanguard STAR Fund et al., supra note 66, at 50,659 (noting that a parent fund
experienced a substantially lower redemption rate than portfolio funds).
155 See supra text accompanying notes 25-34.
156 See supra notes 139-44.
157 By its terms, § 12(d)(1)(F) is available only for registered investment companies. See
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-12(d)(1)(F) (West 1997).
1998]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
institutions or foreign institutions other than investment companies. Given the
substantial and growing volume and the diversification benefits of cross-border
investing, 158 there is little basis on which to single out mutual funds as a
financial institution that should, or can, be insulated from the effects of foreign
market developments. 159
Finally, even assuming that the worst fears of its proponents were valid, the
antipyramiding provision is overly broad in several ways.' 60 Section 12(d)(1)
applies to investments by open-end funds of closed-end funds as well as to
investments by closed-end funds in open-end companies. Yet since closed-end
fund shares are not redeemable, none of the redemption scenarios feared by the
proponents of the antipyramiding provision could exist in the former
situation. 161 In the latter situation, it is of course possible for a closed-end fund
to redeem its shares in an open-end fund. But because the closed-end fund is
itself not obligated to redeem its shares, the special fear envisaged in the PPI
Report (a domino effect started by redemptions at the parent level) cannot
occur.
The antipyramiding provision is also overly broad in its coverage of
investments by registered funds in foreign funds because the United States lacks
an interest in protecting minority shareholders in such funds from the effects of
redemption pressures. In addition, the five and ten percent restrictions in
subsections 12(d)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii) are also not necessary to protect against
redemption pressures.
The five and ten percent restrictions do somewhat reduce the chance that an
acquiring fund will be forced to redeem its shares in the portfolio fund, as these
restrictions ensure that the acquiring fund will have plenty of assets (other than
158 See, e.g., Request for Comments, supra note 40, at 25,324 (stating that in 1989, 193
U.S. investment companies "with total assets of about $27 billion" "invest[ed] primarily in
foreign securities"; "50 other open-end companies had at least 25% of their portfolios
invested in securities traded outside of the United States, with total assets of about $15.1
billion"); Christopher G. Bernard, Note, Towards an International Market in Mutual Funds,
36 VA. J. INT'L L. 467, 469 n.7 (1996) (observing that in 1994, 657 foreign companies from
43 countries had shares listed on a U.S. exchange or NASDAQ).
159 See ROGER G. IBBOTSON & GARY P. BRINsoN, GLOBAL hv=G: TIE
PROFEssIONAL's GuIDE TO TrE WoRLD CAPrrAL MARKErs 145-48 (1993) (correlation of
worldwide equity returns). But cf Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987-88
(2d Cir. 1975) (discussing plaintiffs' argument that the collapse of Fund of Funds caused an
adverse economic effect on U.S. securities markets and on American investors). See
generally Bernard, supra note 158 (proposing international standards for mutual fund
regulation).
160 Of course, some of these restrictions may be justified as furthering the provision's
other goals, such as breaking up concentrations of financial power.
161 Because of this, the liquidity requirements do not apply to closed-end funds.
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fund shares) to sell if necessary. However, the three percent limit in section
12(d)(1)(F)(i) seems adequate to address redemption concerns because even if
the acquiring fund was forced to sell all its assets, the target fund would
experience only a three percent redemption, a tolerable level that is within the
historic range.
B. Excessive Concentration of Financial Power
As discussed above, 162 although Congress and the SEC were concerned
about the conflicts of interest and other harms that may arise due to the threat of
redemption by a parent fund, they had a separate concern about the
concentration of power that fund holding companies represented. In this
respect, the antipyramiding provision is one of several applications of the
nation's traditional populistic suspicion of financial power per se. This suspicion
is expressed (among other places in the Act) in section 12(d)(1)(F), which
permits a fund to invest more than five percent of its assets in a single fund or
more than ten percent of its assets in all funds combined only if it votes its
shares either in the same proportion as other holders of the portfolio fund or as
directed by the parent fund's shareholders, after seeking their instructions. 163 In
either case, the manager of the holding company has no voting control over the
portfolio fund.
Once again, section 12(d)(1) seems poorly designed to achieve Congress's
stated goals. First, the Act seems to take an overly cautious view of control. In
other contexts, Congress concluded that intercorporate control does not exist
until significantly higher cross-ownership exists. The Act itself, for example,
presumes that a person does not control a company if the person owns less than
twenty-five percent of the company's stock. 164 In its regulation of takeovers of
noninvestment companies under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Congress
chose not to even require disclosure of corporate investments until they reached
the five percent level. 165 In the insider trading arena, only ten percent
162 See supra text accompanying notes 73-76.
163 See Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80a-12(d)(1)(A)(I)-(l),
12(d)(1)(F), 12(d)(1)(E)(iii)(aa) (West 1997). Use of the former option is more likely since the
latter one-seeking voting instructions from the parent's investors-would require the parent
fund to arrange with the portfolio fund's management to obtain proxy solicitation material so
that the parent fund can pass it along to its shareholders in time to obtain their instructions.
164 See id. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(9) (1994). The Act's "control" definition is relevant,
e.g., to its definitions of "affiliated person," see id. § 80a-2(a)(3), and its coverage of
investment companies acting through subsidiaries, see id. § 80a-7.
165 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1994).
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stockholders are presumed to have control. 166
Moreover, smaller funds would be unable to acquire even three percent of
another fund because of the five and ten percent restrictions in section
12(d)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii). 167 Although section 12(d)(1)(F) offers an exemption from
the five and ten percent restrictions, many funds would find this exemption
impractical because the conditions in section 12(d)(1)(F)(i)-(ii) may conflict
with the acquiring fund's obligation under section 22(e) of the Act to promptly
redeem its securities on demand. The five and ten percent restrictions are thus
difficult to justify from the viewpoint of preventing concentrated financial
control (because their only relevance is to reduce the permitted interfund
acquisition below three percent). 168
In addition, the antipyramiding provision is based on the assumption that a
holding company that acquired a significant stake in a fund could seize control
from that fund's shareholders. Yet it is widely acknowledged that, even more
so than in the context of public corporations, a fund's shareholders do not
control it-the adviser does. 169 If any entity is to control a fund, a holding
company investor (which is, after all, a part owner of the fund) seems a better
choice than the manager, which often has no ownership interest in the fund and
faces extensive conflicts of interest in the operation of the fund.
As a related matter, despite its goal of constraining financial power, the
antipyramiding provision does nothing to address the power of the companies
that sponsor and manage mutual funds. While Congress has long been
concerned with the harmful effects that might arise from the excessive size of
funds, it has not considered whether the same harms might arise from the
growth of fund complexes and the resulting ability of a single advisory
company to control the assets of all the funds in that group. 170 In fact, power in
166 See id. § 78p(a) (identifying 10% stockholders as "principal stockholders");
Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors, and Principal Security Holders,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 28,869, Public Utility Holding Company Act Release
No. 25,254, Investment Company Act Release No. 17,991, 56 Fed. Reg. 7242, 7244 (1991)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249, 270, and 274) (noting that 10% stockholders
are "presumed to have access to inside information because they can influence or control the
issuer as a result of their equity ownership"); see also William M. Isaac & Melanie L. Fein,
Facing the Future-Life Without Glass-Steagall, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 281, 335-36 app.
(1988) (bank holding companies may acquire up to 5% of the voting securities and up to
24.9% of the equity of non-banking-related companies).
167 A fund trying to invest in a larger fund could reach the 5 and 10% restrictions before
it acquired 3 % of the target fund.
168 These restrictions are also not justifiable from the viewpoint of avoiding redemption
pressures. See supra text accompanying notes 152-59.
169 See supra text accompanying note 190-94.
170 All funds in a fund group or complex are organized and distributed by a single
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the advisory business is more concentrated than it is among individual funds.
Concentration in the investment management business is increasing. 171 Given
the adviser's unchallenged authority over each fund it advises, the harms
perceived from concentrated financial power at the fund complex level seem no
less worrisome than those at the fund level. 172 Yet the "master-feeder" and
"hub-and-spoke" liberalizations allowed by Congress and the SEC in recent
years facilitate growth of fund complexes.
C. Layering of Fees
As discussed above, a major basis for Congress's enactment of section
12(d)(1) was a concern that the holding company structure led to higher total
costs to shareholders of the holding company because of "layering of fees. "173
Yet section 12(d)(1) appears to be a flawed weapon for combating this problem,
for several reasons.
First, section 12(d)(1) is overly broad with respect to cost-layering because
of the way it treats foreign funds. Foreign funds are excepted from almost all of
the Act's registration and substantive requirements' 74 because of the lack of a
U.S. interest in protecting their investors, who generally are not U.S. residents.
The concern about excessive fees applies only to shareholders of the holding
company, since no "layering" affects public shareholders of a lower-tier fund.
The "cost layering" theory, then, provides no policy reason to apply section
sponsor. The funds also share a common adviser, which in practice is selected by the sponsor.
See Rock, supra note 28, at 1604.
17 1 See Michael Quint, More Consolidations in Mutual Funds, N.Y. TISMs, Aug. 25,
1994, at D3; Peter Truell, Insurer Is Said to Near a Deal for Scudder, N.Y. TIMES, May 30,
1997, at D1 (noting that a study predicts about 20 companies each with more than $150
billion in assets will dominate the advisory business by the year 2000); see also BAUMOL Er
AL., supra note 7, at 26 (the number of funds per complex increased from four to six during
1982 to 1987).
172 In certain respects, a ftnd family is subject to the same limitations as a single fund.
All funds managed by the same adviser are probably affiliates for purposes of section
12(d)(1), and thus their holdings must be aggregated when determining compliance with the
3 % limit. See FundTrust, supra note 46, at *3. In addition, holdings of funds in a family may
also be aggregated for purposes of determining compliance with the Act's diversification
requirement, which prevents funds calling themselves diversified from owning more than
10% of an operating company. See Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
5(b)(1) (1994); see also Roe, Political Elements, supra note 74, at 1477.
173 See supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
174 See DIVISION OF INV. MANAGEMENT, SECURITIES & EXCH. COMM'N, PROTEMCING
INVEORS: A HALF CENTURY OF INVEMSqMENT COMPANY REGULATION 105-14 (1992)
[hereinafter "PRoTEcnNG INvESToRs"] (discussing exceptions for private investment
companies and qualified purchasers).
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12(d)(1) to foreign investment companies.
Second, layering of costs occurs in other legally permissible contexts.
These include accounts managed by investment advisers1 75 and funds managed
by bank trust departments. 176 Both such accounts may invest client funds in
mutual funds, leading to "layered" costs because of the existence of fees
charged by the portfolio funds and by the adviser or trust department.
Third, Congress and the SEC have concluded that a fund holding company
whose portfolio funds are wholly owned (i.e., a master-feeder fund or a hub-
and-spoke fund) may have lower costs than a free-standing fund. 177 As noted
above, the basis for this belief is that such a fund could reduce its operating
costs while improving services delivered to shareholders, because, e.g., funds
in a holding company may share research and investment management
services. 178 In addition, Congress and the SEC have accepted the argument that
fund holding companies may achieve greater diversification than individual
175 The SEC has, for example, allowed a Fidelity affiliate to charge a fee of up to 1% of
assets for a service that invested, on a discretionary basis, clients' money in other Fidelity
funds. The portfolio funds charged annual fees and sales loads up to 3%. See Fidelity
Managed Accounts, SEC No-Action Letter, Dec. 13, 1988, available in LEXIS, FedSec
Library, NoAct File, 1988 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1641, at *7.
176 See 3 FRANKEL, supra note 42, § 7.1, at 32.
177 See Vanguard STAR Fund, supra note 66, at 50,659 (contending a fund holding
company would reduce "account maintenance costs, because an investor will not need to
maintain two or more accounts to attain a desired allocation"; such funds produce lower
expense ratios because of "a new STAR Fund Portfolio's ability to take advantage of the
existing asset base created by the acquired Funds"; "the resulting addition of assets to The
Vanguard Group produces cost savings and other benefits for all Funds even if they are not
the acquired Funds").
178 See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. E868 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 1995) (statement of Rep. Fields)
(remarks of Rep. Fields, sponsor of bill that became the 1996 amendment, supporting fund-
of-fund relaxation because it would enable "professional money managers" to "benefit, on
behalf of the investors in their mutual fund, from the expertise of other professionals in
investments with which they themselves may not be familiar"; this advantage is especially
important because of the growing need of U.S. managers to invest their clients' money in
foreign markets with which they have less familiarity); Brinson Relationship Funds et al.,
supra note 150, at 48,517 (holding company structure facilitates following "a large number of
issuers ... [by] exploit[ing] the expertise of [specialized] portfolio managers"); FundTrust,
supra note 46, at *21 jnvestors in a fund investing in unaffiliated open-end funds would
benefit from "efficient professional selection and monitoring of the large number and
bewildering variety of mutual funds."); Hub-and-Spoke Report, supra note 124 (reduced costs
due to "economies of scale by sharing... fixed expenses of portfolio
management[,] ... fund administration [and]... securities transactions"); Vanguard Special
Tax-Advantaged Retirement Fund, Inc., Investment Company Act Release No. 14,361,
[1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,737 (Feb. 7, 1985); Gruber,
supra note 13, at 783.
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funds, both by increasing the number of underlying stocks held and by owning
funds with differing investment styles. 179 Although the SEC has accepted these
arguments only in the context of funds within a given "family" (and dismissed
them regarding fund holding companies owning less than one-hundred percent
of their portfolio funds' 80), theoretical reasons exist to think the conclusion less
valid in the latter context-and some evidence shows that such benefits result
from interfund investments outside fund families. 18 1 If true, these conclusions
suggest that fund holding companies could offer their shareholders less volatile
returns at lower costs than funds prevented from investing in other funds above
the section 12(d)(1) limits. The fact that at least some fund sponsors desire to
participate in such funds182 suggests that they might offer investors a risk-
reward package at an attractive cost.183
In any event, as shown above, neither section 12(d)(1) nor any of the other
statutory and regulatory steps taken to address high costs184 have reduced fund
179 See Thomas A. Smith, Institutions and Entrepreneurs in American Corporate
Finance, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1, 18-20 (1997) (espousing diversification of stock as a method
needed to eliminate firm-specific risk).
180 See PPI REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 89-2337, at 320 (1966) ("[D]iversification upon
diversification does not result in greater safety in proportion to the number of layers imposed
on the original investment.").
181 See 141 CONG. REc. E868 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 1995) (statement of Rep. Fields);
Vanguard Special Tax-Advantaged Retirement Fund, Inc., supra note 178; Hub-and-Spoke
Report, supra note 124; Wang, supra note 1, at 1043-45; Francis Flaherty, Multifinds:
Diversifled to a Fare-Thee-Well, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1993, § 1, at 45; Kara Fitzsimmons,
Owning Closed End Funds- Unwittingly, WALL ST. J., May 8, 1997, at C23 (open-end funds
buy closed-ends because they are perceived as good investments); Fund of Funds Loses a
Round, supra note 112, at 61; Yee, supra note 112, at 71.
182 See, e.g., American Pension Investors Trust, SEC No-Action Letter, Feb. 1, 1991,
available in LEXIS, FedSec Library, NoAct File, 1991 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 279 (open-end
fund investing in 10 to 35 unaffiliated open-end funds); Bodipo-Memba, supra note 124, at
Cl; Phalon, supra note 100, at 63 (before the 1970 amendments, two funds not affiliated with
Fund of Funds registered as fund holding companies).
183 The possibility that a fund holding company might make other changes in the
operation of its portfolio funds by means of changes imposed through the corporate
governance process, see infra text accompanying notes 230-31, would offer another way to
reduce costs for shareholders.
184 See Disclosure of Mutual Fund Performance and Portfolio Managers, Securities Act
Release No. 6988, Investment Company Act Release No. 19,382, 58 Fed. Reg. 19,050,
19,050 (1993) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 270, and 274) (requiring fund
prospectuses or annual reports to compare fund performance to index and provide investors
with information showing performance on per share basis); Consolidated Disclosure of
Mutual Fund Expenses, Securities Act Release No. 6752, Investment Company Act Release
No. 16,244, 53 Fed. Reg. 3192, 3192 (1988) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239 and 274)
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fees, which are significantly higher than they were at the time of adoption of the
1970 amendments that tightened section 12(d)(1).
D. Undue Organizational Complexities
The concern with organizational complexity is that it might be difficult for
an unsophisticated shareholder to appraise the true value of his investment due
to the complexity of a holding company's structure. 185 This concern does not
explain the application of section 12(d)(1) to acquisitions by foreign holding
companies because Congress had no interest in protecting foreign investors
from such complexities.' 86 With respect to domestic funds, a fund holding
company seems no more complex than many interlocked corporate structures.
Indeed, the ability to calculate the net asset value of each fund in a holding
company seemingly makes it easier for an investor to evaluate her holding than
it would if she owned shares in a corporation with complex cross-ownership.
V. EFFECTS OF THE ANTIPYRAMIDING PROVISION: THE ABSENCE OF AN
EFFECTIVE MANAGERIAL MONITOR
Fund managers are agents of the fund's shareholders. As it does in
noninvestment company corporations, the separation of management and
ownership in funds gives rise to a host of problems that have been explored by
scholars.1 87 This Article suggests that the antipyramiding rule exacerbates these
problems in the mutual fund arena.
Professor Black has identified several categories of possible constraints on
corporate managers.188 These include shareholder monitoring via the corporate
governance process, the corporate control market, the product market, the
capital market, incentive compensation arrangements, creditor monitoring, the
(fee table required in mutual fund prospectuses); Anand, supra note 13.
185 See Hearings, supra note 77, at 238-39 (statement of David Schenker); 86 CONG.
REC. S2844-47 (Mar. 14, 1940) (statement of Sen. Wagner).
186 See The Phoenix Funds, spra note 66, at *5 (foreign banks to buy shares of a U.S.
fund on the condition that the nature of investment would be adequately disclosed to non-U.S.
investors).
187 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 144, at 1284; Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder
Initiative: A Social Choice and Game Theoretic Approach to Corporate Law, 60 U. CN. L.
REV. 347, 347-65 (1991); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of
Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEo. L.J. 445, 453-63 (1991); Roe, Political Theory,
supra note 73, at 54 (citing studies); Manuel A. Utset, Disciplining Managers: Shareholder
Cooperation in the Shadow of Shareholder Competition, 44 EMORY L.J. 71, 86-92 (1995).
188 See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor
Voice, 39 UCLA L. REv. 811, 887 (1992).
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risk of bankruptcy if a company cannot service its debt, fiduciary duties, and
cultural norms of behavior. The following discussion examines certain of these
types of restraints in light of the antipyramiding rule.
A. Shareholder Monitoring via Governance Process
One way shareholders may monitor and control their fund's manager is
through the corporate governance process. However, though shareholder
approval is required for many fund actions, 189 in practice shareholders
routinely approve management proposals.19 Even the SEC has concluded that
shareholder voting is "often a 'ritualistic anachronism"' for mutual funds,
noting that funds often find it difficult to obtain a quorum, meeting attendance is
generally sparse, and votes are almost always supporting the adviser's
wishes. 191 The paucity of shareholder activism is noteworthy even in
comparison to corporations other than funds, in which significant difficulties
with managerial monitoring have been identified. 192
189 See, e.g., Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §80a-15(a) (1994); id.
§ 80a-15(a)(2)-(b)(1) (shareholders or board must approve certain advisory and
underwriting contracts); id. § 80a-15(a)(3)-(4) (shareholders must approve new
management contract after termination or assignments of the contract, and approve
changes to the management contract); id. § 80a-13(a) (changing funds' fundamental
investment policies requires a vote of shareholders); Rules and Regulations, Investment
Company Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R. §270.12b-l(b)(1) (1997) (management contracts
must be approved by shareholders initially). See generally 3 HAZEN, supra note 42,
§ 17.6; Richard M. Phillips, Deregulation Under the Investment Company Act-A
Reevaluation of the Corporate Paraphernalia of Shareholder Voting and Boards of
Directors, 37 Bus. LAw. 903 (1982); Wang, supra note 1.
190 See, e.g., WHARTON STUDy, H.R. REP. No. 87-2274, pt. 1, at 67 (1962) ("[O]pen-
end investment companies are typically legal shells without genuine autonomy, controlled by
external management interests."); Phillips, supra note 189, at 908-09 & n.13; Wang, supra
note 1, at 1005-08; Simon, How Fuds Get Rich, supra note 21, at 131 (shareholders
approved request by closed-end stock fund to increase its fees 31%, taking its profit margin
from 84% to 88%; shareholders approved 17% fee raise for a fund that already had after-tax
profits of 37%).
191 PROTECrING INVESrORS, supra note 174, at 272-76 (funds often cannot obtain a
quorum at shareholder meetings, and vote outcomes are almost never contrary to the wishes
of the adviser); see also Galfand v. Chestnut Corp., 545 F.2d 807, 808 (2d Cir. 1976) ("The
typical fund ordinarily is only a shell, organized and controlled by a separately owned
investment company adviser, which selects its portfolio and administers its daily business.");
Request for Comments, supra note 40, at 25,327 ("assumption that, in the open-end
management investment company context, voting shareholders and directors are
'redundant'").
192 See Rock, supra note 187, at 450-51.
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The same is generally true of funds' bbard of directors, which despite
requirements of independence have generally been viewed as displaying little
independence from the fund's adviser, because they are appointed by the
adviser and dependent on the adviser for continued tenure and information. 193
Although the board of directors sometimes negotiates fee rates below that
proposed by the adviser, the amount of the reduction is usually marginal. 194
Weaknesses in the fund governance process led the SEC to propose an
alternative fund form that would eliminate shareholder governance
altogether.' 95
It is possible that, by eliminating funds as significant investors in other
funds, the antipyramiding rule has contributed to the fragmentation of mutual
fund ownership. 196 Indeed, this was one of the Act's stated goals. 197 Small
funds acquiring large funds may in effect be prevented even from reaching the
three percent level allowed by section 12(d)(1) by the five and ten percent limits
in section 12(d)(1)(A).' 98
Theory predicts that when stock ownership is fragmented, management's
power will increase at the expense of shareholders due to collective action
problems. Evidence exists that the absence of large shareholders, who might
profitably undertake the function of monitoring the fund manager, has
contributed to the dominance of the manager over shareholders and to the high
193 See PPI REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 89-2337, at 10-12, 102-21, 126-27 (1966);
WHARTON STUDY, H.R. REP. No. 87-2274, at 30-34, 66-67; Advanced Notice and Request
for Comment on Mutual Fund Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 12,888,
47 Fed. Reg. 56,509, 56,510, 56,511 (1982); PROTECrmG Thv srops, supra note 174, at
255-66; Tamar Frankel & Wayne M. Barsky, The Power Struggle Between Shareholders and
Directors: The Demand Requirement in Derivative Suits, 12 HOFSmA L. REv. 39, 58-59, 64
(1983); Phillips, supra note 189, at 910-11; Wang, supra note 1, at 983; John A. Otoshi,
Note, Class Action Treatment of Shareholders' Suits Under Section 36(b) of the Investment
Company Act, 83 COLUM. L. RFv. 2039, 2041-42 (1983); Tr-Continental Directors Turn
Deaf Ear on Wake Up Call, N.Y. TIMWES, May 18, 1997, Bus. Sec., at 7 (publisher of
Morningstar Mutual Funds states that boards "just rubber-stamp management's plans"); cf
Ex-Fund Manager Blocks Trustees'Actions, N.Y. TIME, June 17, 1997, at C2.
194 See Wang, supra note 1, at 990.
195 See Request for Comments, supra note 40, at 25,326-27.
196 Individuals own about 74% of all mutual funds and about 60% of all equity and bond
funds. See INVESMENT Co. INST., supra note 154, at 35; see also WHARTON STUDY, H.R.
REP. No. 87-2274, pt. 1, at 64; Survey Finds Small Investors Held On to Stocks in Slump,
WASH. PoST, Apr. 16, 1994, at Dl.
197 See supra note 88.
198 The conditions imposed by the section 12(d)(1)(F) exemption limit that provision's
utility as a means of escaping the 5 and 10% caps.
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level of fees fund shareholders pay.199 Funds suffer from agency problems that
appear to be at least as great as those afflicting corporations.200 Of course, other
institutions, whose investments are not impeded by the antipyramiding rule,
could have taken large stakes in funds and overcome collective action
problems. At a minimum, though, the provision has eliminated one significant
large investor from the corporate governance arena.
B. Corporate Control Market
Sections 12(d)(1) and 17 have effectively eliminated other funds as potential
acquirers of mutual funds. The private right of action available under section
12(d)(1) provides funds with a weapon against hostile investments in excess of
section 12(d)(1)'s strict limits.201
A critical question, though, is why other entities have not acquired funds. If
hostile fund takeovers or proxy battles presented profitable investment
opportunities, one would expect others to take advantage of them. Potential
acquirers would include wealthy individuals, banks, and pension funds.
A number of obstacles would face such acquirers. Wealthy individuals
could not act through private investment funds because, as a result of the 1996
amendment to the Act, the antipyramiding provision now applies to such funds
199 See WHARTON STUy, H.R. REP. No. 87-2274, pt. 1, at 64, 67 (shareholder voting
rights have "limited value" because of wide diffusion of share ownership); 1d. at 30 (conflict
of interest inherent in fund governance structure led to levels of adviser compensation greater
than what would result from arm's length bargaining); Coffee, supra note 144, at 1283 n.21,
1335-36; Rock, supra note 187, at 452 (increasing concentration of shareholding raises
problems of increased agency costs within the institutions); Wang, supra note 1, at 1006; see
also PPI REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 89-2337, at 12-13 (1966); Otoshi, supra note 193, at 2039;
Simon, How Funds Get Rich, supra note 21, at 132-33 (lower expense ratios for management
of institutions' funds are attributable to their greater bargaining power).
Large shareholdings are correlated with higher returns for corporations. See Bernard S.
Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 895, 917-24 (1992); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 71, at 1006-08.
200 See Black, supra note 188, at 814-15; Coffee, supra note 144, at 1283, 1335-36;
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 71, at 985-86; Rock, supra note 187, at 452.
201 See, e.g., Bancroft Convertible Fund, Inc. v. Zico Investment Holdings, Inc., 825
F.2d 731 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that the Investment Company Act had an implied right of
private action in enforcing the antipyramiding provision and defining a tender offeror as an
investment company); Clemente Global Growth Fund, Inc. v. Pickens, 729 F. Supp. 1439
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that genuine issues exist as to whether successor's tender-offer
vehicle was an investment company); Clemente Global Growth Fund, Inc. v. Pickens, 705 F.
Supp. 958, 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
As to whether hostile acquisitions of mutual funds would be possible in the absence of
these legal restrictions, see infra Part VI.
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(despite their exemption from the definition of investment company). 202
Although individuals are exempt from the antipyramiding provision by virtue of
the fact that they do not come within the investment company definition, a
group of individuals operating together in a coordinated fashion are likely to be
viewed as an investment company and thus subjected to the antipyramiding
provision.203 Therefore, only wealthy individuals acting alone could avoid the
antipyramiding provision.
A corporation could be the acquirer, but only if it avoided classification as
an investment company by keeping its investment (combined with other
securities it owned) below forty percent of its assets and did not engage
"primarily" in making such acquisitions and other securities investing or
trading. The uncertainty associated with the latter requirement and the high
costs of classification as an investment company might deter corporations from
taking this step.
Banks' ability to invest in mutual funds is limited. National and state
Federal Reserve System member banks may not invest for their own account in
stock mutual funds (though purchase of shares of investment-grade bond funds
is permissible).204 However, financial constraints limit banks' ability to make
use of their power to buy both bond and equity mutual funds.205 In addition,
some banks' interests in providing custodial and other services to funds may
dissuade banks from taking public, hostile roles against funds.206 Similar
conflicts might afflict small money managers who hope to sell research to funds
or their broker-dealer affiliates. 207
Nonscientific observation suggests that the legal and practical barriers
facing nonfund acquirers are high. In the few takeovers of U.S. closed-end
202 Private investment funds are exempt from the Act under §§ 3(c)(1) (funds with fewer
than 100 investors) and 3(c)(7) (funds all of whose investors are sophisticated). See generally
Steven Boehm, Hedge Funds and Other Collective Investment Vehicles, 30 REv. SMc. REG.
& COMMODITIEs REG. 35 (1997) (discussing the impact of §§ 3(c)(1) and (c)(7)).
203 See Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789, 791 (1940) (current version
codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-2(a)(8) (West 1997)) ("investment company" includes "any
organized group of persons whether incorporated or not"); see also Bancroft Convertible
Fund, Inc., 825 F.2d at 736-38; Clemente Global Growth Fund, Inc., 705 F. Supp. at 963-
65.
204 See Isaac & Fein, supra note 166, at 335-36 app. Bank holding companies' power to
acquire fund shares is also limited. See id.
205 See Coffee, supra note 144, at 1319-20.
206 C. Jill E. Fisch, Relationship Investing: Will It Happen? Will It Work?, 55 Omo ST.
L.J. 1009, 1028 (1994); Roe, Political Elements, supra note 74, at 1503.
2 07 See Roger M. Klein, Straining to Uncork Value in a Closed-End Fund, N.Y. TIMEs,
Apr. 23, 1995, § 3, at 8 (small money manager's unwillingness to state publicly it would vote
against management in fund proxy battle).
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funds that have occurred, the acquirers were wealthy individuals and private
investment funds2 0 -not banks or other institutional investors. 209 Outside the
United States, the acquirers of funds have often been other funds.210
It is possible that non-legal factors reduce the economic appeal of funds as
an acquisition target for institutions other than funds. A decision by an acquirer
to invest in a fund in the hope of improving its performance must depend on a
balancing of the anticipated costs of monitoring activities against the benefits to
be derived from a change in the fund's policies. This investment opportunity
must then be compared to other investment opportunities available to the
potential acquirer. It may be that only another fund can realize enough of the
advantages of a fund acquisition to make it worthwhile. This seems a realistic
possibility, since many of these advantages would arise from the economies that
only another fund could realize.211 In addition, funds are ideally suited to be
active shareholders of other funds: fund acquirers possess a higher degree of
expertise in fund management (e.g., evaluating fund performance and operating
methods) than do other possible acquirers. 212
208 These individuals and private investment funds were at the time exempt from the
antipyramiding provision. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
209 See, e.g., ALRZED FREDNAN & GEORGE Scorr, bAvSNG IN CLOSED-END FUNDS:
FINDiNG VALUE AND BULDING WEALTH 381-86 (1991); Susan Antilla, Raiders Lick Their
Chops Over Closed-End Funds, USA TODAY, Mar. 1, 1989, at B3; Floyd Norris, A Crucial
Vote at Cypress Fund, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 14, 1989, at D12; Sequoia Partners Denounces
Counselors Tandem Fund's Poor Performance, PR Newswire, Mar. 23, 1990, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Arcnws File; see also Klein, supra note 207, at 8 (bank trust
department has a practice of voting for management in proxy battle). But see Nicholas
Denton, Malaysia Fund to Go Open-Ended, FIN. TIMEs (London), July 19, 1996, at 18 (fund
converts to open-end form in response to demands of shareholders, including pension fund).
210 See, e.g., Nick Gardner, Kleinwort PkMs Trust Switch, SUNDAY TIMM (London),
Aug. 4, 1996, § 6, at 1 (manager will "open-end" trust to avoid hostile takeover bid by
another investment trust); Regent Confident on GT Chile Fund Takeover, INT'L MONEY
MARKEIG, Aug. 18, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Arcnws File (fund
organized to make hostile acquisitions of closed-end funds in Czech Republic); Michael R.
Sesit, London Fund, Irate Suitor Pose Wider Worry, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 1996, at C1
(hostile takeover of GT Chile Growth Fund by fund manager); Nikki Tait, Throgmorton Bid
Wins Frarlington, FIN. TIEs (London), Apr. 30, 1988, Weekend Supplement, at IV; Shiv
Taneja, Regent Pacific Trust Buys Assets of Thornton Asian, Bus. TMEs, June 7, 1996, at 18
(U.K. investment trust acquired another such trust by tender offer); Roger Taylor, Aggressive
Instincts Threaten the Quiet Life, FIN. TIMEs (London), Sept. 23-24, 1995, Weekend Money
See., at 2 (describing takeovers of U.K. trusts by other trusts as a way that the investment
industry is trying to expand again).
211 See supra note 13.
212 Cf Smith, supra note 179, at 28-29 (relying primarily on Black, supra note 188, at
834-35).
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C. Incentive Compensation Arrangements
Financial incentives are another way to align the interests of shareholders
and managers and thereby reduce agency costs. 213 The typical investment fund
advisory contract partially accomplishes this because fees are based on a
percentage of assets under management and better performance tends to attract
additional assets.214 But to the extent fund outflow and inflow do not correlate
to performance, 215 this alignment is imperfect. Moreover, from their position
as insiders, managers can derive opportunities to engage in personal investment
activities that can conflict with shareholders' interests.216
Compensation schemes that would improve the alignment could be devised:
the adviser's compensation could be tied directly to performance.2 17 The
adviser (and fund directors) could be paid in shares of the fund. Yet statutory
and regulatory barriers make these techniques difficult for funds to employ,218
and it appears neither is widely used.219
D. Creditor Control
Monitoring of fund managers cannot be conducted, as it is in some national
213 Agency costs can be viewed as the costs of those actions, including monitoring and
"bonding," that investors must take to police conflicts between the interests of the adviser and
investors. See Black, supra note 188, at 882-85; Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity
Reexamined, 89 McH. L. Rnv. 520, 595-96 (1990); Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee,
Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 MtcH. L.
REV. 1997, 2040 (1994); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside
Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REv. 863 (1991); Wang, supra
note 1, at 974-75.
2 14 See Wang, supra note 1, at 975.
215 See id.
2 16 See generally Rock, supra note 28, at 1614-26.
217 Studies have found that corporate performance is positively correlated with the
proportion of equity owned by management. See Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund
Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 795, 821 (1993).
218 Fund managers may not be compensated with equity or long-term options. See
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-18(d), 23(a) (1994); Gilson &
Kraakman, supra note 71, at 999. Tying payments under the advisory contract to fund
performance is difficult. See Coffee, supra note 144, at 1364; John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC
and the Institutional Investor: A Half-Time Report, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 837, 866-67
(1994).2 19 Independent directors of funds are generally paid annual cash fees, rather than shares
of stock or other performance-based compensation. See Wang, supra note 1, at 974.
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systems,220 by banks because funds' ability to borrow is strictly limited.221
E. Redemption
The redemption right gives investors a low-cost means of exiting a fund.
Redemption by a fund investor hurts the manager much more than sale by a
holder of corporate stock hurts corporate officers. The latter sale merely results
in a change of stockholders, whereas a fund redemption reduces the assets
under management, directly reducing the manager's income. 222 The ease with
which investors can evaluate fund management and compare the performance
of different funds (due to the daily computation of net asset value and the many
publications that rate and compare funds) reduces search costs for the exit
decision. Additionally, the absence of brokerage commissions and the existence
of telephone redemption methods lower the transaction costs of exit. The threat
of redemption could therefore serve as a powerful constraint on management. It
has been suggested that the adequacy of this exit threat has eliminated investors'
need for any other means of monitoring managers. 223
Yet, there is some reason to question whether the redemption right
adequately constrains fund managers. 224 The fact that redemptions do not
correlate well with poor performance and that investors are relatively
insensitive to and ignorant of fund expenses should weaken the argument that
the redemption threat acts as such a constraint. It is difficult to reconcile the
exceptionally high and rising profit levels of fund managers with an assertion
that the redemption threat suffices to discipline fund managers. An evaluation of
the reasons for these seeming market imperfections must await further study. 225
220 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 71, at 987-88.
221 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(f).
2 22 See Roe, Political Elements, supra note 74, at 1506.
223 See Wang, supra note 1, at 1007; see also Coffee, supra note 144, at 1288-89.
224 Of course, no such constraint exists for closed-end funds. The lack of effective
managerial constraints might contribute to the persistent discounts at which such funds trade.
See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
225 One study found the market for money-market funds to be competitive. See BAUMOL
ET AL., supra note 7, at 111-25. However, because money-market funds are a more
homogeneous product than, e.g., equity funds, these results may not apply outside the money-
market fund context.
One possible explanation for the phenomena of high and rising fees and investor
insensitivity to price and performance is that the proliferation of mutual funds (see supra text
accompanying notes 7-11), which may have resulted from the antipyramiding rule, has given
some find advisers a degree of monopoly power due to product differentiation. See
MoNopou c CoPETrroN THEoRY. STmDIES IN IMPACr (Robert E. Kuenne ed.) 160-64
(1967); WALTER NICHOLSON, INTERmEDIATE MCROE ONOMIVCS AND ITs APPuCATION 455-
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VI. A World Without the Antipyramiding Provision: Are Hostile
Takeovers or Relational Investing Possible for Funds?
In the absence of sections 12(d)(1) and 17, is it possible that funds could
take sufficiently large stakes in other funds to enable them to invigorate the fund
governance process, or even to engage in a hostile takeover?
With regard to closed-end funds, the answer is clearly yes. Although they
are rare and difficult to accomplish, investors have made successful hostile bids
for funds trading at discounts to their net asset value.2 26 They have then
generally forced the funds to liquidate or convert to open-end form.
It appears that no U.S. open-end fund has ever been the subject of a hostile
takeover. It has been assumed that such a takeover is impossible. 227 One
scholar has reasoned that, because open-end fund shares are always redeemable
at net asset value, it is impossible for gaps between such shares' value and their
market price to develop, and that such gaps are critical to attracting
acquirers. 228 But would such takeovers be possible in the absence of the
antipyramiding rule?
To address this question, it is helpful to consider why an investment
company might acquire shares in an open-end fund. The incentive for the
manager of the acquirer is clear: because open-end fund management fees are
generally a percentage of assets under management, a manager could increase
its fees if, by investing in another open-end, it could either increase the value of
59(1990).
226 See, e.g., BULLocK, supra note 77, at 49-61 (hostile takeovers of closed-end funds
during the 1930s); FREDMAN & Scorr, supra note 209, at 390-95 (listing funds liquidated or
converted to open-end form and discussing obstacles to takeover of closed-end funds); Klein,
supra note 207.
For examples of such takeovers outside the United States, see Nicholas Denton, Invesco
Seeks to Oust Lazard as Manager, FIN. TWEs (London), Aug. 6, 1996, at 17; Denton, supra
note 209, at 18; Never Forget the Discount, INv sroRs CHRoNicLE, Apr. 28, 1995,
Fin./Bus. See., available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Arcnws File (attributing reduction in
average U.K. investment trusts' discount to threat of takeovers); Damian Reece, Family
Finance: Predators Stalk Small Trusts, SUNDAY TELERAPH, Sept. 17, 1995, at 8, available
in LEXIS, Nexis ibrary, Arcnws File (fund managers reorganizing trusts to fend off hostile
bids); Roger Taylor, No Room at the Investing Industry, FIN. Tas (London), July 19-20,
1996, Quarterly Review of Personal Finance, at 7 (Fleming decided to liquidate its high
income trust under pressure from a hostile bid).
For a discussion of legal issues relating to merging funds, see Sapir & Bernstein, supra
note 12.
227 See Coffee, supra note 144, at 1284 n.21 ("Only in the case of the closed-end mutual
fund is a takeover even conceivable, and actual instances of such takeovers are virtually
unknown."); Wang, supra note 1, at 978.
228 See Wang, supra note 1, at 978.
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the assets it owned or attract additional shareholders. The former could occur if
a manager, through its superior investment skill, improved a target fund's
investment practices, for example, by replacing employees, or altering the
fund's investment strategy.229 Alternatively, the acquiring fund might be able to
reduce the target fund's operating costs by superior operating techniques and
economies of scale. Hostile takeovers of closed-end funds have succeeded in
doing so.230 Savings might be achieved, for example, by piggy-backing on the
target fund's previous marketing efforts or by merging the target fund and the
acquiring fund, enabling better utilization of record-keeping and distribution
systems. 231 Taking advantage of tax losses through a merger of the two funds
might be an additional attraction. 232 Even if the chances of improving the target
fund's performance were uncertain, the risks of such an investment might be
low because of the high liquidity of fund shares (which results from their
redemption feature), an important consideration for the acquiring fund, which
would face redemption obligations itself.
An acquiring fund could also use an interfund investment as a means of
attracting additional shareholders at the parent level, and thereby expand assets
under management. The prospect of improving the performance of portfolio
funds, as discussed above, would be one means of doing so. The acquiring fund
might also draw additional investment by offering its shareholders a package of
services and risk-reward characteristics that investors would perceive as
superior to other available investments. These services would include
(1) additional investment management services (a professional manager that
229 While there have apparently been no instances of this occurring among open-end
funds, there have been attempts to form closed-end funds that would profit by taking stakes in
other closed-end funds that were trading at a deep discount, then liquidating or open-ending
them. Section 12(d)(1) has of course been an insurmountable obstacle to such efforts. See,
e.g., Rogers, Casey & Assoc., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, June 16, 1989, available in
LEXIS, FedSec Library, NoAct File, 1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 754; Thomas J. Herzfeld
Advisors, SEC No-Action Letter, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 77,919
(May 16, 1985).
230 See, e.g., BuLLoCK, supra note 77, at 56; FREDMAN & ScoTr, supra note 209, at
393-95 (investor group purchased 30% of a closed-end fund, transferred its advisory contract
to their affAliate, and reduced its expenses from 1% on all assets to 0.75% on assets below
$50 million and 0.5% on assets above that amount); cf No Mourners for the Deadman
Funds, supra note 29, at 62 (fund that had declined in value by 84% since 1993 had an
expense ratio of 25.6%).
231 See supra text accompanying note 13.
232 See, e.g., FREDMAN & ScoTr, supra note 209, at 392-94 (acquisition of closed-end
in part to capture tax losses); cf Vincent Warther, Instability in Open-End Mutual Funds: An
Examination of the Interaction Between Capital Gains Overhangs and Mutual Fund Inflows
(May 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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monitors and evaluates the performance of the portfolio funds' managers) and
(2) additional diversification.
Thus, there seems adequate motivation for a fund to invest in another fund
in the hope of merging with it, combining operations, or at least engaging in
relational investing with the goal of improving the target's performance. 233 The
idea that a fund holding company might acquire a stake sufficiently large
enough to give the acquirer some control over the lower-tier was, after all, a
specific concern of the proponents of the antipyramiding provision.234 Before
the 1970 amendments to the Act, Fund of Funds Ltd., the foreign fund whose
abuses spurred adoption of those amendments, held more than thirty percent of
the shares of eight open-end funds. This amount is adequate to enable the
acquiring fund to influence or control the target's management. 235
VII. CONCLUSION
The discussion above suggests that section 12(d)(1) (and, to a lesser extent,
section 17) have largely not achieved certain of their goals of lowering fees paid
by investors and combating concentrations of financial power. In addition, the
antipyramiding provision seems not well-drafted or otherwise is flawed in its
rationales of redemption pressures and avoiding organizational complexity.
Moreover, the provision appears to have had effects well beyond its goals.
Under the guise of breaking up the power of large funds, the provision may
simply have supported the growth of fund complexes and the power of fund
managers. Seeking to avoid fee "layering," the provision may have eliminated
one of the few constraints on managers' decisions to increase fees. Using the
rhetoric of investor protection, the law may have worked to protect fund
233 Relational investors purchase large stakes in companies as long-term investments and
then play an active role in firm management. Black & Coffee, supra note 213, at 2055-59. It
has been suggested that institutions are poorly suited to the role of active corporate monitors
because such a role conflicts with their primary mission-diversifying risk for their clients.
See Smith, supra note 179, at 40-41. Since an investment in another fund would not diminish,
and might even increase, the diversification of the acquiring fund, this objection should not
present an obstacle to interfund investments.
2 34 See PPI REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 89-2337, at 315 (1966) ("An unregistered foreign
based fund holding company, free of any statutory limitation on the percentage of the
outstanding stock of mutual funds which it may purchase for its [portfolio], can acquire very
substantial or even controlling interests in its portfolio funds.").
235 See, e.g., FPMMAN & Scotr, supra note 209, at 393-95 (after acquirer purchased
30% of a closed-end fund, its directors agreed to transfer the advisory contract to the
acquirer's affiliate); Forging Ahead with Funds, EAST EUROPEAN BANKE, Aug. 1995, at 12,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Arcnws File (Nomura, owner of 31% of shares, forced
split up of Slovak fund trading at deep discount).
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management from competition. There is a need for empirical study to verify
these hypotheses. And there is a need for a debate on the validity of the goals
and methods of this little-examined, yet significant, provision.

